

Daily Report

Supplement

East Europe

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East Europe SUPPLEMENT

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25 June 1993

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*** 'Psychological Warfare' in Vojvodina Charged**
*93BA1131A Budapest HETI MAGYARORSZAG in
Hungarian 4 Jun 93 p 23*

[Article by I. Vass: "The Calvary of Hungarian Organizations in Vojvodina; Youths Were Threatened; Hungarian TV Crew Taken to the Police Station"]

[Text] Despite a multiparty system in Little Yugoslavia, minority interest groups are exposed to consistent pressure, even though they have legally elected representatives seated in both the republican and the federal legislatures. Not a single day passes without the press, or one or another ranking official of some state organ or political party condemning the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMDK] and its demands for autonomy. This is done with finding an enemy in mind, and proves to be an excellent method for veiling the country's international, social, and economic situation from rank and file people, to at least temporarily divert attention from the situation.

The persecution of the VMDK has a dual purpose, in addition to pinpointing an enemy. By persecuting that organization they are able to postpone the granting of minority rights, as well as instill fear in Hungarian residents. The campaign against minorities and their organizations is headed by Federal Minister for Human Rights and Minority Affairs Margit Szavovics. She hails from Hungary and conducts a glorious choir in which the leader of the Serbian guerrilla troops in Bosnia sings the same tune, while organizing his activities in the Bacsa region.

Everyone Is a Suspect

Indications are that in addition to the VMDK's legitimate activities, everyone else is suspect, including the Hungarian Cultural Association of the Vojvodina [VMSZ] all the way to the Hungarian Television's recording crew. Last May, the television crew planned to record a documentary about writer and VMSZ president Karoly Dudas, but in less than 15 minutes after its arrival, two armed police commandos entered Dudas' home and took the television crew and its equipment to the State Security Division of the police, without written orders to do so. Once there, an official declared that he found no cause for taking the television crew to the police. He apologized for and on behalf of others, then let the crew go. Subsequently, however, Police Chief Milan Jerinkics prohibited the crew from recording the show, based on an alleged Interior Ministry decree, one that requires all journalists and recording crews entering Yugoslavia to have visas with work permits. The crew was forced to return to Budapest without accomplishing its task.

In the end, the executive committee of the VMSZ wrote an open letter to Dobrica Cosic, the president of the Yugoslav Federal Republic, expressing outrage over the coarse action

taken by the police despite verbal and written permissions given by the appropriate authorities, notably the heads of the Ministry of Information of the Republic and of the Territorial Information Secretariat. In its letter the VMSZ executive committee said that this regrettable incident serves as evidence that the police does not respect the principles of constitutional statehood, thus also gravely damaging the extremely important relationship between Yugoslavia and Hungary.

Harassing the VMISZ

A week later Yugoslav border guards detained five representatives of the Vojvodina Hungarian Youth Association [VMISZ] Szabadka [Subotica] organization at Horgos, a Yugoslav-Hungarian border crossing point. They were invited by the VMDK's local organization in Szeged, and were on their way there. The border guards found all the documentation pertaining to the VMISZ on one of the detainees, and presented him to the police officer in charge of the border guards.

According to what the youths reported to the editors of the Ujvidek [Novi Sad] MAGYAR SZO and to Szabadka mayor Jozsef Kasza, the border police reviewed the VMISZ documents very attentively, then prepared photo copies. One member of the VMISZ executive committee was held for an hour and a half in a room at the border police, while his companions were told to stand by. The border police scattered the personal belongings of the young man, and used vulgar terms cursing people, whose business cards they found. They also threatened the young man by saying that he would no longer have a peaceful life inside the territory of Serbia, and that he and the VMISZ would be exposed to harassment by police and the military. Suggestions were made that the youths cease their political activity, and that they keep busy with other things. Trisztian Ver, the young man in question, was told in a sarcastic tone of voice to report the events that transpired to president Jozsef Kasza; this was meant to be an indication that the border police was aware that a month earlier Ver had reported to Kasza that four VMISZ members had been taken to the police at night, and had been detained without any reason for more than two hours, while forced to endure psychophysical torture.

This time they were let go to Hungary with a threatening "see you again." Nevertheless, they were allowed to return without further harassment.

Psychological Campaign

One cannot be sure how much of the above amounts to deliberate political action, and what constitutes transgressions of police authority. The fact is that while official policies wholeheartedly support the idea of statehood for Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, no discussion about minority rights, or—God forbid!—about possible autonomy is tolerated in Yugoslavia.

The most recent VMDK letter to the Serbian head of government, recommending the opening of dialogue regarding autonomy for Hungarians in Yugoslavia, outraged the power structure tremendously. Consistent with the old practice, this outrage was initially expressed in protest meetings and statements of condemnation by various ranking officials of the ruling party (and many other extremist parties), and was followed by state functionaries lecturing to leaders of the minority inclined to pursue

"separatist" movements. The lecturers included the above-mentioned minister, all the way down to territorial secretaries. According to them, these minority demands were an organic part of the propaganda campaign against Serbia.

Psychological warfare is being waged against the minorities, against those who have not yet picked up their things and left.

*** Strength of Factions Within BSP, Chances for Reform**

93BA1059B Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 20 May 93 p 10

[Article by Ruen Krumov: "Does the 100-Year-Old Party Have a Chance of Being Reformed From Within?"]

[Text] Like the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], today the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the heir of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] is one big conglomerate that embraces a wide range of nostalgic communists, camouflaged socialists, and political personalities who aspire toward a social democracy. Furthermore, the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] formed a preelection coalition with about half a dozen parties that remind us a great deal of the party phantoms within the SDS and that mostly represent their leaders.

To begin with, what is the status within the parliamentary group of the BSP and the coalition known as the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy?

The biggest group of deputies in the parties in coalition with the BSP belong to the Fatherland Labor Party, which holds nationalistic views: Mincho Minchev, Evgeni Drumev, and Gincho Pavlov. One deputy each represents, respectively, the Christian Women's Movement: Elisaveta Milenova; the Stefan Stambolov National Liberal Party: Khristo Atanasov; the Bulgarian Liberal Party: Vulkan Vergiev; the Constitutional Rights and Freedoms Political Club: Miroslav Durmov (this deputy in the Grand National Assembly was deputy chairman of the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] but quarreled with Akhmed Dogan, left the movement, and founded his own political organization). The sixth coalition party was the Christian Republic Party. Recently, however, its representative, Konstantin Adzharov, said that he was leaving the coalition and declared himself independent. After supporting Professor Berov's government, he now opposes it. The inclusion of the rightwing Era-3 group in the electoral coalition caused a scandal. The BSP rapidly broke up this union. Era-3 failed to be represented in parliament. The Supreme Court restored Era-3's position within the coalition, but it was too late.

Excluding the seven deputies within the coalition parties and the four nonparty representatives, the remaining 94 deputies of the PSSD [Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy] are members of the BSP. Thirty-two of them supported the Association for Social Democracy Ideological Movement. Recently, one of them, Stefan Stefanov, abandoned the movement and joined the main BSP group. Conversely, two deputies, Georgi Nikolov and Kolyo Paramov, joined the OSD [Union for Social Democracy].

Currently there are 33 deputies who are members of the OSD: Aleksandur Tomov (deputy chairman of the OSD—resigned), Andrey Lukanov, Atanas Paparizov, Vasil Donchev, Velislava Dureva (member of the leadership), Georgi Pirinski (member of the leadership and deputy chairman of the PSSD), Georgi Bliznashki (member of the

leadership), Georgi Nikolov from Silistra, Georgi Popov, Georgi Tambuev, Dimitur Yonchev (deputy chairman), Elena Poptodorova (member of the leadership), Iliyan Iliev, Ilko Iliev, Yordan Roynev, Kolyo Paramov, Kosta Karaivanov, Krasimir Nikolaev, Krasimir Zhelyazkov, Milen Chakurov, Petur Balabanov, Petya Shopova (member of the leadership—resigned), Plamen Vulkanov, Plamen Denchev, Rosen Karadimov (organizational secretary), Svetoslav Michev, Sonya Mladenova, Stoyan Ivanov, Todor Pandov, Toshko Mukhtanov (ran as nonparty member), Trifon Mitev, Filip Bokov (member of the leadership), and Chavdar Kyuranov (chairman).

The other ideological trends within the BSP, such as the Marxist Initiative, the ASO [Alternative Socialist Association], and others, have no deputies.

The main group of the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy includes 62 deputies.

After the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe, intensive efforts were made to "restructure" and reform the former communist parties. Many of them renamed themselves socialist or social democratic. Thus, for example, the former Polish United Workers Party became the Polish Social Democratic Party; in the former GDR, the Party for Democratic Socialism appeared; in Hungary it was the Socialist Party. Efforts were made also to reform the parties in a social democratic spirit.

The BCP was no exception. Less than two months after 10 November 1989, on 5 January 1990, the Alternative Socialist Association (ASO) was founded in Cinema House. It was a BCP faction. Most of the ASO workers were members of the Club for Glasnost and Perestroika, which played a major and positive role in the development of the dissident movement prior to 10 November. Most of the club activists were either members or former members of the BCP, expelled from it. Some of them, such as Zhelyu Zhelev, Petko Simeonov, Chavdar Kyuranov, and others, were among the founders of the SDS on 7 December 1989. After some hesitation, Chavdar Kyuranov left the SDS and remained within the BCP. Most of the communist members of the club, such as Academician Kiril Vasilev, his son, Professor Nikolay Vasilev, Ivan Nikolov, Ivan Dzhadzhiev, Valentin Vatshev, Nedyalko Yordanov, and others, were among the founders of the ASO, whose main objective was to reform the century-old party.

However, already at the second national conference of the ASO-BCP faction, the first split occurred. Some ASO leaders, headed by Nikolay Vasilev, considered that the reforming of the BCP from within was a hopeless project, for which reason they founded the Alternative Socialist Party (subsequently renamed the Alternative Social Liberal Party). Another part of the ASO also abandoned the party. The two groups that had left the party decided to run for the Grand National Assembly with their independent tickets. The results, however, were catastrophic.

At the fourth national conference of the ASO, on 21 July 1990, there was another split: Ivan Kalchev, the former

Marxism-Leninism teacher, who had adopted extreme anti-communist positions, created the Forum of Free Democrats (subsequently renamed Union of Free Democrats); the independent ASO members, headed by Manol Manolov, assumed social democratic positions.

As early as 1990, most of the ASO faction within the party left the faction and joined the independent ASO. The ASO within the BSP today is an ideological trend with no particular substance. Its leader, Valentin Vatshev, was also one of the founders of the New Social Democratic Party. After that, however, he rejoined the BSP.

Within the Grand National Assembly, another effort for reforming the BSP was made by the Road to Europe faction, headed by Rumen Georgiev. This effort as well failed and Way to Europe left the party. Today the ASO-Independents and the Evropa Social Democratic Club are members, together with the BSDP [Bulgarian Social Democratic Party] and the BRSDP [Bulgarian Workers Social Democratic Party], of the recently created Bulgarian Social Democratic Alliance and have signed the protocol of cooperation of centrist parties and movements.

Past experience has confirmed that the reformist factions within the BSP, that are trying to turn it into a social democratic party, once within the party have no serious influence on its internal processes, and that their influence becomes even smaller once they leave the party. This has been the case, at least so far, not only in all former Eastern European parties but also in the Western European parties as well.

In addition to the official platform submitted by the BSP executive bureau, "A Prospect for Bulgaria," the delegates and journalists were also given the platforms of the OSD, the ASO, and the Marxist Platform. These latter platforms were not even voted upon. Despite the pathetic speeches of the spokesmen for the OSD, Andrey Lukanov, Chavdar Kyuranov, Velislava Dureva, Petya Shopova, and others, the framework of the resolutions of the conference were drawn up by the party ideologue, Al. Lilov. He rejected what were, in his view, the two "extreme" trends: On the one hand, the one which would like to turn the BSP into a perfected BCP, naturally by condemning the errors and distortions (this was aimed at the Marxist Platform); on the other, the trend which considered the end objective of the BSP renovation to be its adoption of social democratic ideas (aimed at the OSD). In condemning such "extreme trends," Al. Lilov supported the formula of a "new, modern, leftist party." Optimistically, he concluded by saying that "we can and must become members of the Socialist International."

Having attended last autumn the congress of the Socialist International in Berlin and being quite familiar with its situation, I can predict that "such" a party has no chance whatsoever of joining this oldest and powerful international, not only as a full member but even as an observer.

[Box, p 10]

The BSP electorate declined from 2,887,766, who supported it in the elections for the Grand National Assembly,

to 1,838,050 votes cast for its in the elections of 13 October 1991 for the 36th regular National Assembly. The difference between the SDS and the BSP was one of no more than 67,517 votes or 1.12 percent of the ballots cast. This gave the SDS deputies 110 seats with 106 going to the BSP and its coalition. After the series of "peeling off" from the SDS, the latter remained with the 86 deputies only (including semi-peeled-off Stoyan Ganev), as a result of which the BSP and its coalition once again have the largest parliamentary group.

[Box, p 10]

Five nonparty members were elected with the ticket of the BSP electoral alliance: Velko Vulkanov, Toshko Mukhtanov, Ana Karaivanova-Davidova, Lyuben Nachev, and Ana Milenkova. Lyuben Nachev, recently elected as a nonparty member, announced his affiliation with the BSP.

* VMRO-SMD Official Views Ethnic Conflicts in Rhodopes

93BA1058B Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 May 93 p 10

[Article by Yanora Grigorova and Yassen Borislavov: "They Are Preparing Something Like an Uprising"]

[Text] *The leader of the VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization] has preserved the mold for casting bullets.*

Zhivko Sakhatchiev, the VMRO leader in Yakoruda, has preserved the mold for casting bullets from the time of the April uprising, as he personally admitted to his fellow citizens last Monday. Some 200-300 people crowded the hall of the public library on the occasion of the anniversary of the uprising. Had there been fewer people, they would have looked like a secret revolutionary committee. Since there were many, they reminded us of the scene depicting the staging of the "Suffering Genoveva" in the novel *Under the Yoke*. No Pomaks were present. Two girls, with faces like angels, recited excerpts from the writings of Dobri Chintulov, particularly emphasizing the words "let the Turkish tribes perish," and "let us break her head with our legs." On the school benches someone had scratched "I give my blood for Turkey," and "never Bulgaria."

Should we have another April uprising so that we could draw the attention of Europe, a fiftyish woman up front asked, after attentively listening to the lecture by Prof. Doyno Doynov, which was the purpose for the meeting in the public library.

That is how everything started in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Western journalist who had recently visited the area said, having noticed that the children of Pomaks and Christians no longer played together. Bulgaria is being betrayed from above, the VMRO people are saying, commenting on the dead silence in parliament concerning the Yakoruda report, asking whether five years from now any Bulgarians will remain along the banks of the Mesta. Of the 12,000 people in the township who had registered as Bulgarians, only 2,500 claimed to be such in the census. Twenty years ago the ratio between Christians and Muslims was the opposite.

An announcement is posted at the entrance of the discotheque in Yakoruda: "Striptease show on 7 and 8 May only." A hundred meters up the street, on the way to the mosque, is the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] Club. Inside, men are drinking plum brandy, violating the rules of Islam. Women are not allowed inside, and behind the counter hangs the framed portrait of Dogan. Other men are in the tavern, drinking big shots of plum brandy, and with the second drink start discussing Vanche Mikhaylov and Yane.

Along the entire way from the Razlog to Yakoruda one goes through villages of some 20 houses each, all of them three-storied, with a clean new minaret rising above them. Women in veils follow donkeys plowing minuscule fields.

According to Zhivko Sakhatchiev, the head of the VMRO-SMD [VMRO-Union of Macedonian Societies] claims that until 2 years ago there were no Turks in the area. At the start of the school year, however, 1,170 children listed Turkish as their native language and feverishly began to study it. Again at that time all study circles in the schools within the township were closed down for lack of money. It was then again that 50 Turkish-language circles were organized. Many people dislike this but no one dares protest, according to the locals. Whatever Bubayko says (the family patriarch) that is what happens. The least that could happen, if one objects, is to find oneself totally isolated.

The geography teacher told the children that Bulgaria is their homeland and that they should love it very much. She was warned by the township not to say this again if she wanted to keep her job. Her husband was warned as well.

Despite the circles and the Sunday schools at the mosque, Turkish is spoken nowhere, for no one knows the language.

Emissaries from the World Islamic League constantly visit the area. The latest visitors, two weeks ago, were clergymen from Libya. In addition to information, they also contributed dollars. How else could the mosque be built in a period of two months? The second secretary of the U.S. Embassy has also been a frequent visitor. After many meetings with local leaders of the DPS, he found time to visit the other side as well.

Data from the December census revealed that there were some Japanese and Eskimos living in Yakoruda, whose native language was Chinese. If some Bulgarians could claim to be Turks, why should we not claim to be Eskimos, the U.S. diplomat was told. He had no answer. In front of the mosque, after the Friday prayers, everyone was issued instruction as to what their native language was and their nationality. The instructions were written in Bulgarian.

*** Filip Dimitrov on SDS Prospects in Elections**

93BA1058A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 10
May 93 p 4

[Article by Filip Dimitrov: "Why the SDS (Union of Democratic Forces) Has No Reason To Fear Elections"]

[Text] The fall of the first democratic Bulgarian government was a heavy blow to the supporters of the SDS. The

pain it caused was natural. It deprived Bulgaria of the possibility to leap across time of becoming a country of a different category, a country that could resolve the endless problems of the communist legacy on the basis of a more or less resolved foreign-debt problem, under conditions of relative financial stabilization and reasonable opportunities for investments by serious and respected foreign partners. Under the conditions of the counterattack mounted by the communist forces throughout Eastern Europe, today most Bulgarian democrats fear for the success of the SDS in the case of eventual elections. Why are such fears groundless?

It is already clear that the main political opponents are still the former BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party], opposing the SDS. Despite its profound internal contradictions, the Communist Party did not simply split, for its electorate consists of people who want to vote not for some kind of fictitious centers or social democratic associations but precisely for their old leaders and their old party. These are the last vestiges of the 1-million-strong giant, precisely the people who are either unable or unwilling to part with it. If they wanted all that much to abandon it, it would have made no sense for them to cling to some kind of extension of this giant, within which we see rather familiar faces that, apparently, use rather familiar cash. Has anyone been able to notice any differences in the policies of the two sections (except perhaps on the issue of who feels more threatened by eventual elections)?

Nor did the SDS split up, despite the fact that, traditionally, land mine after land mine keeps exploding under it, either laid or activated by its political opponent. Naturally, this creates inconveniences and confusion. The people ask themselves: When will finally the splits come to an end? However, the fate of those who have split is always one and the same. Still riding on the crest of the wave, in 1991 the "centrist-liberals" were able to gain a few percentage points. In the course of time, however, they gradually became shadows of the past. In the search for a "pragmatic" behavior, however, the new dissidents of the Ludzhev-Michkovski group have nothing to distinguish them from the communists: They use the same phraseology, launch the same attacks, and vote the same way. It is true that they guarantee the majority in the parliament but, through it, they have been able to make its work totally meaningless.

The SDS remains the only political force that can assume responsibility for governing the country.

It is no accident that, although he openly said "a la guerre comme a la guerre," Professor Berov has tried for quite some time to squeeze himself behind the SDS shingle. It was no accident that his government, elected with the help of the votes of the BCP and the DPS [Movement of Rights and Freedoms] swore that it would implement the SDS program (those who had voted this government in power claimed that there was either no program or that the program could not be implemented). Actually, to this day it has not publicly abandoned this intention, which makes its situation comical.

A study of history shows that whenever a major change occurs, dissidents appear exclusively to hold the powers that assume the responsibility for the change. Only such a force has built-in dissidents, for the opposite is simply absurd (no one introduces dissidents within a declining party). Those who are tempted to become dissidents are always member of its ranks, for change is never quite easy and requires a great deal of sacrifice and efforts, if the latter are not assisted by available goods. It is not astounding that it is precisely those who quickly begin to benefit that are the first to reject hard work. In such a concoction there always are people who are less courageous and more fearful, or else who consider themselves "unappreciated," and therefore who can become corrupted. Those who can endure, however, have only one road to follow: the one expected by the electorate. They do not split before the change has been made. Hence the struggle for names and symbols (as though the voters are feeble-minded and cannot realize who defends whose interests).

They all have programs (naturally, filled with beautiful words). However, it is only the SDS and the BCP that have something extra. The BCP has a debt of \$12 billion and the impossibility to repay it. The foreign exchange reserve has been reduced to zero. The stores are empty and in the lines (starting at 4:00 a.m.) some people have even collapsed and died. The SDS is responsible only for itself.

One Year of Governments

It is true that this year has been full of difficulties and deprivations. However, has anyone failed to understand what the SDS was trying to accomplish, and what were the strategic tasks which it tried to fulfill? It must achieve financial stabilization, resolve the problem of the foreign debt, bring into the country \$1 billion via the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and return the land and confiscated property. Could anyone doubt that this is in the interests of the tremendous majority of the people and that the purpose is to develop a middle class and an opportunity to work, despite the entire production decline? It is true that those who are dreaming of eliminating the debt on a piecemeal basis and those who fear competition from the West were able to destabilize the government at a critical point. It is true that when the restitution of the land was undertaken and was still gathering speed, those same forces hurled themselves at the government in an effort to stop it. They were joined by whoever felt threatened by court trials, something that was hanging over his heads but had still not taken place. But could anyone deny that laws were passed in the parliament that finally (and only then) made the basic steps toward the reform (investments, land, restitution, and even privatization) possible?

We kept inflation under control and, consequently, the impoverishment of the people; the new procommunist government, however, wasted this opportunity and is now safeguarding the interests of just a handful of people who have a great deal of money while pushing all the others down.

We accumulated a foreign exchange reserve of almost \$1.5 billion. This was the only guarantee that something could

be successful in the economy. Now, the procommunist government is irresponsibly wasting this fund (so far about one-quarter of it within a period of four months).

We have changed the appearance of the cities through restitution, and many people already have something on which they can rely in order to survive or start a small business. We began to give back the land, and no longer does anyone doubt that the land can be returned but that this is being delayed either deliberately or because of confusion. The same applies to privatization.

We tried to indict some criminals and mafiosi, and it was precisely then and precisely for that reason that the strongest attack against the government was launched.

Despite some opposition within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself, the SDS pursued an independent mature policy, took a number of right steps, earned a certain reputation (which the present government is trying to wreck by all possible means), and substantially helped to lower the possibility of an uncontrollable conflict on the Balkans, a conflict that would involve Bulgaria as well.

All of this is a substantial addition to the SDS program. It indicates that the SDS does not lie and that its governance could be useful to the nation and to the individual citizens, to many more citizens than have voted for us so far.

It is true that the SDS committed some errors and omissions.

However, could anyone have the illusion that a new and unaccustomed style of governing can be established without any error? It would be suitable to point out some of the errors.

The SDS government did not display sufficient firmness and resolve in the first six months of its governance. Fear of worsening the tension, insufficient reciprocal support between the parliamentary group and the government, and contradictions within the government itself, which had been structured on the basis of a number of compromises, contributed to this result. After the first decisive actions, however, the efforts to overthrow it began.

The SDS was unable to establish proper communications between the government and the parliament and to guarantee adequate unity of action between them. The government was unskillful in explaining to the parliamentary group its efforts concerning the strategic objectives, and did not give the latter adequate support to make it suitably firm. This enabled a few "leaders" both within the government and in the parliament to make intrigues with impunity and to instill mistrust of any specific step or encourage despair whenever a delay occurred.

Poor work was done with the cadres. Combined with contradictions within the government itself, this enabled some circles to obstruct and stop the work and process of change.

All this, however, does not eliminate the essential aspects of SDS governance. Those who, today as well, want to speak

exclusively of the errors in that governance—most frequently the people who like to shout “down with communism” but, who knows why, most frequently put trump cards in the hands of the Communist Party—pursue (or subconsciously implement) three basic objectives:

- To confuse the already established priority of SDS tasks and, because of the inadequate efficiency demonstrated in resolving them, and to deprive of any sense the need for their formulation;
- To discourage the SDS electorate by belittling SDS achievements and present SDS governance in an entirely negative fashion. They thus not only eliminate the hope but also create a wrong impression, to the effect that Bulgaria’s problems can be resolved easily. This sets a trap for the next government that will rely even less on miracles;
- By attacking SDS policy through its governance, they negate the most serious proof of the already apparent clarity of SDS policy. Their objective is to return to the situation of 1991 when the open attacks from the left (“the centrist-liberals”) and, in a more concealed fashion, from the right (Podkrepa) forced the SDS to emphasize feelings and slogans in order not to be confused with the “moderate” dissidents, for there still were few people who, more forcefully than we did, swore to their support of democracy and their anticommunism. At that point, the painful question of who is who forced us to adopt a certain line of behavior. Today, after more than one year in power, it is natural for our sympathizers to be familiar with the answer. The SDS can structure its behavior with less feelings and more reason, more convincingly, even in the eyes of those who, not as an impulse but on the basis of practicality worthy of respect, would have supported it. However, when the “uncompromising” critics, the real “hardliners” the “real SDSers” question such a clarified political nature of the Union, should we have once again to convince the already convinced 30-35 percent of the voters, to try to “win over” those we had already “won,” to the cause and, naturally, to find it impossible to substantiate our practical choices?

The assessment of the existing situation also determines the fundamental tasks which the SDS must carry out if it wishes once again to assume responsibility for governing in the name of Bulgaria.

It must not retreat from the view that this parliament cannot form a stable government. Consequently, the SDS cannot participate in such a government. When the government headed by Professor Berov falls, it would not seem strange at all for, once again, the talk of November-December 1992 to resume: let the parliament go on working in order not to stop the reform, we do not need elections, for we cannot know how successful we would be; a stable majority could be recreated, and so on.

The SDS must neutralize the provocateurs who, hiding behind the mask of criticism, will either independently or as “hardliners” attack the SDS, accusing it of helplessness and questioning its already clear political image. Regardless

of how many such individuals may be found within the SDS, it is exceptionally important to the Communist Party to shift the struggle to our territory. If we do not fight among ourselves it truly would have nothing with which to oppose us. That is why, in general, it was necessary for it to waste its mandate and to rely on Professor Berov and the Ludzhev-Trenchev lobby in parliament.

All SDS structures must support the work already undertaken on accurately determining the condition in the individual areas and sectors of management and of the economy, the training of cadres and the formulation of an operative plan for action, to be implemented immediately after the SDS regains the power.

We are not ashamed of our governance, although we wanted to be more efficient. Political forces are developed through experience and by learning from lessons. The SDS has already become structured. It knows what it wants, what it will do, and why it will do it. It is not easy to break it up or defeat it in front of the voters.

* Handling of Blood, Testing for AIDS

93WE0415C Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in
Bulgarian 6 May 93 p 6

[Unattributed interview with Dr. Vutkovski, chief physician at the Republic Blood Donor Center; place and date not given: “One Lev and 50 Stotinki Per Liter of Blood”]

[Text] *Reserves currently total 1,008 units, and about 200 units are needed on a daily basis.*

“We will not catch up with France. That country has four million blood donors, almost one-tenth of the country’s population. To give blood is a matter of honor both in France and in Japan. In our country, after the moral crisis that occurred, it would be excessively daring to hope that we shall make advances in this area.”

This is a quotation from Dr. Vutkovski, chief physician at the Republic Blood Donor Center. We talked to him after the latest appeal made by the journalists on television, the KLUB M periodical, and Radio Express, who appealed to others to follow their example. They donated their blood. At the present time the center has 1,008 units of blood, and the daily needs average 200 units. Useful shelf life is between 20 days to two weeks. The needs of Sofia and the rest of the country are much greater. In 1985, voluntary blood donors in Sofia numbered 60,000 and there were 450,000 throughout the country. Today there are 35,000 blood donors in the capital and 210,000 throughout the country and their number continues to decline.

[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK] What is the price per liter of blood?

[Vutkovski] One leva and 60 stotinki. The price is ridiculous. No other product in Bulgaria costs so little. Even lemonade costs eight leva and the cost of giving blood, taking into consideration inflation, is about 700 leva.

It is only after our country begins to develop normally that we would be able to speak of normal blood giving. We have

become a country of pensioners and who among those 2.7 million people could give blood? Which of the 600,000 families that are suffering from the crisis would come to us?

[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK] Are there legislative reasons for this situation?

[Vutkovski] This dates from 1986. According to Article 157, Paragraph 1, Item 3, blood donors are given the day off when they give blood and the next day as well. No member of the legislation has deemed it necessary to ask for the opinion of the specialists. I, for example, have another question: If we go to a shop where 100 healthy men are at work and 90 of them would like to give blood, according to this meritorious legal provision they should not work both that day and the next. The shop would be paralyzed for 48 hours. If it drops out of the assembly line, the entire combine would stop work. That is why when we go to the enterprise, the director welcomes us as follows: "If the workers do not give blood no one would fire me. But if I fail to fulfill the production plan, the workers would not be paid and I would be kicked out of the enterprise."

[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK] In your view, are the Bulgarian people confident that giving blood is a harmless procedure?

[Vutkovski] I believe that not everyone knows that the entire process is sterile; the implements are used only once and then burned.

[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK] But fear of AIDS and hepatitis remains.

[Vutkovski] This is because we are not given a platform from which to tell the truth. For example, the rumor was spread through some newspapers and the BTA [Bulgarian Telegraph Agency] that a hepatitis A epidemic had broken out as a result of giving blood. Once again the people withdrew; they were frightened. When we are allowed to speak on the radio and the television it is usually for 40 to 50 seconds. What could one say in such a short time?!

[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK] Do we have reliable AIDS tests?

[Vutkovski] We use the tests developed by the Abbott Company. They are used in the United States and Germany. They are a 100 percent reliable.

[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK] Do you have any hopes that the center will acquire a new building?

[Vutkovski] We had plans that would have cost millions of leva but all of this has remained on paper only. The Denitsa-2 furniture house was built on the lot which had been allocated for the center. Now we have a new plan for three million leva's worth of construction, but the assigned builder was the Plovdiv building organization. Who is about to leave his home and family and come and live in mobile homes for a few years! They took the lot and the money, and now we have no possibilities whatsoever.

*** Number, Location, Average Age of AIDS Patients**

93WE0415A Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 17 May 93 p 3

[Article by Valeriya Marinova: "The Average Age of the 113 Bulgarians With AIDS Is 23; There Are No Infected Drug Addicts"]

[Text] Sofia, 16 May—There are 113 HIV-positive cases, of whom 20 are sick, and 18 deceased Bulgarians and 90 HIV-positive foreigners who were extradited, according to the latest data on the spreading of AIDS. This was reported by Dr. Radka Argirova from the Central AIDS Laboratory on the occasion of the international day of struggle against that disease.

Over the past two years, in Bulgaria the disease has been transmitted mainly heterosexually, and the number of HIV-positive pregnant women is expected to increase. This is confirmed by several cases in which the newborn were natural carriers of the virus.

For the past three years there have been no "imports" of that infectious disease, Professor Argirova pointed out. The disease has been localized and its biggest center is Gabrovo. Most carriers are discovered when they donate blood. The difficulties are caused by the squeamishness of the sick and the fact that AIDS tests are voluntary.

At the present time efforts are being made to introduce mandatory testing at the skin and venereal disease centers so that the most likely carriers of the disease may be tested.

Unfortunately, we cannot detect all the carriers and the sick, and, in all likelihood, they are 10 times more than those on record, according to Dr. Argirova. We have still not identified a single sick drug addict, but this category will soon become a problem for the physicians. The age of AIDS carriers is also steadily dropping; currently it is 23.

Suspicious Sale of Timber by Krajina's Hadzic
93BA1126C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 93 p 12

[Article by R.B.: "How Republic of Serbian Krajina Is Being Deforested Under Orders From Goran Hadzic: Sale of Timber Because of Higher State Interests"]

[Text] *The greatest source of wealth for the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] is its forests, but if they continue to be consumed at the current pace, the RSK could find its existing forest potential threatened before long. There are no controls on cutting down the forests, and in many murky deals wood is being used to barter with the Serb republic [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and the FRY. However, as people well acquainted with conditions say, there are indications that timber from the RSK is also going outside Yugoslavia, naturally through arrangements by private agencies.*

The fact that the forests are being chopped down is confirmed by only one of the multitude of sales contracts, concluded on 1 February of this year between the public enterprise "Krajinazuma" and the "Dusanovac" Agricultural Cooperative in Lovas, eastern Slavonia. The subject of the contract is timber of oak and walnut as well as roundwood, the selling price of which is, to put it mildly, ridiculous! The oak and Canadian walnut timber has been sold for 80,000 dinars per cubic meter, with roundwood going for 50,000 dinars.

As can be seen in the contract, it was concluded under orders from Goran Hadzic, the president of the RSK, "because of higher state interests" of the RSK. The signers of the contract are: on behalf of "Krajinazuma" public enterprise, Vrgin Most, "Eastern Slavonian-Western Symian" forest estate, Vukovar, headquartered in Vukovar, Milos Kojic; on behalf of the "Dusanovac" Agricultural Cooperative in Lovas, Ljuban Devetak; and on behalf of the order-issuing authority, the then-commissioner of the president of the RSK, Stevo Bogic, the then-vice prime minister of the RSK. The wood was to be delivered until

the end of March, in quantities specified in the contract, about which the signers were supposed to submit a report to the president of the RSK.

The headquarters of the "Krajinazuma" public enterprise is in Vrgin Most, and Petar Rodic, the director of the enterprise, emphasizes that this is an unprecedented contract, and that the public enterprise was completely circumvented during its conclusion.

"Our enterprise is young, which is in fact normal, because our republic is also young," says Petar Rodic. "But that does not mean that we are only just learning how to walk."

We note only that the "Krajinazuma" enterprise was founded last year. Forests cover 540,000 hectares in the territory of the RSK, with an estimated 53.3 million cubic meters of wood. The annual growth amounts to 1.5 million cubic meters, and if the goal is to preserve nature and the forests, then at most 1 million cubic meters can be cut down each year. Over the course of the past year, 365,000 cubic meters of building timber and more than 600,000 metric tons of pulpwood have been produced. As far as the composition of the forests is concerned, oaks account for 23 percent, beech trees for 39 percent, conifers for 15 percent, and ash trees for 6 percent.

Wild game is raised and hunted in the forests, which is one of the enterprise's significant activities. In the Baranja game preserve, there is the special Kopacki Marsh reserve with 6,235 hectares. The annual catch of fish is 110 carloads. The "Krajinazuma" public enterprise also has 650 hectares of cultivable land and produces around 3,000 metric tons of grain and forage crops annually, which is used to feed the game. In the Ilok region, an 83-hectare vineyard yields 400,000 liters of quality wines each year.

It must be emphasized that the contract and deforestation in question constitute a harmful agreement and dubious deal transacted under the orders of the president of the republic, Goran Hadzic. Accordingly, those to whom the forests are entrusted are abusing the "higher state interests." Because that is only an excuse for trade, most of the money from which goes into private pockets.

*** U.S. Investments in Czech Republic Noted**
 93CH0679B Prague ZEMEDELSE NOVINY in
 Czech 21 May 93 p 2

[Article by "si": "Opportunity for the U.S. Economy. The United States Begins Investing in Our Country. Will the Overseas Market Open Up to Us? Cooperation in Ecology"]

[Text] "I wanted to draw the U.S.'s attention to the opportunity offered by the cooperation between Westinghouse and Czech firms," said Minister of Industry and Trade V. Dlouhy yesterday upon return from the United States. "If it is successful, it will be the first case of a Soviet-designed nuclear power plant being brought up to Western parameters."

The U.S. Government should participate in the joint project of the CEZ corporation and Westinghouse at least by offering its backing, even though its guarantee of a loan from the U.S. Ex-Im Bank is highly improbable. But it could secure more favorable terms for this loan, for instance "softer credit."

Other talks conducted by Minister Dlouhy involved trade relations between the Czech Republic and the United States. From the latter, we are for the time being importing more than we are exporting there, but nevertheless we would wish to see the U.S. market opening up more for us. A U.S. delegation that arrived in the Czech Republic just prior to Minister Dlouhy's completion of his trip to the United States has already begun talks about textile import quotas.

The trip to the United States also included talks about the energy policy of the United States, the status of its nuclear-power industry, and its cooperation with the Czech Republic on selected projects in the fields of power generation and ecology. V. Dlouhy consulted with U.S. experts on energy legislation, the principles of which will be taken up by parliament in June. U.S. legislation in the field of nuclear power is among the best in the world.

Statistical data comparing the volume of investment in the Czech Republic by individual countries since 1989 through the first quarter of this year indicate that the United States holds second place, with 27.9 percent (right after the FRG). Other joint undertakings are on the way. A joint venture with the Let Kunovice company is to be signed in the near future.

*** Outstanding Debt Capitalization Effects Viewed**
 93CH0679A Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in
 Czech 21 May 93 pp 1-2

[Article by Marcela Doleckova: "Government No Longer Able To Shift Problem From Enterprises to Banks. Prudent Business Will Not Permit Extensive Debt Capitalization"]

[Text] Karel Bednar, first deputy general director of the Bank of Commerce, displays a banker's skepticism in viewing notions held by the Ministry of Industry and Trade that debt capitalization will be among the measures to curb the domino effect in enterprise bankruptcies.

In the first place, points out Karel Bednar, the rules of prudent business laid down by the Czech National Bank and binding on commercial banks define the banks' elbow room quite precisely. Above all, a bank's share participation in enterprises may not exceed 10 percent of their basic capital assets. But at the same time this share participation may not exceed 25 percent of the bank's capital and reserves.

It is true that the rules provide for cases when the bank may go beyond this limit. This is when the debtor's share offering pays for the credit extended, which is exactly a case corresponding to the "debt capitalization" program. But the rules immediately add that when this exception is granted the bank is obligated to sell the stock or shares within two years. Two years may be quite short. And when it is time for the banks to sell the shares their price would undoubtedly take a deep dive—perhaps deeper than warranted. Thus, in many cases the banks could get less than if the enterprise went bankrupt today and the bank's claims were partially satisfied from the assets.

Banker Bednar is convinced that if the banks were now to "rescue" enterprises from bankruptcy by capitalizing their debt it would mean not only a mere postponement of the problem but also shifting it from the shoulders of the enterprises to those of commercial banks.

But do not forget the fact that the state will exert pressure on the banks. This can be deduced from the unsubtle nudging of enterprises into the debt registration program [zapoctova akce] (whatever results may come from this operation, threats of recalling the director or assuming the right instead of a court to decide on granting or denying the three-month grace period is rather strongly reminiscent of central management), as well as from the repeated statements of the industry minister and his deputy that debt capitalization is among the declared state interventions to aid businesses threatened with bankruptcy. Nevertheless, Mr. Bednar contends that in the case of the Bank of Commerce the government's pressure would not succeed (especially because it is no longer the majority shareholder in this bank).

The Bank of Commerce is prepared to capitalize its claims only in exceptional cases. If it was willing to do so in the case of Skoda Plzen, it was only because it was offered (so far only offered) shares at a fraction of their book value. In two years' time their price may possibly rise.

Otherwise the Bank of Commerce naturally sees greater commercial benefit in simply writing off uncollectable debts. This consideration applies particularly to enterprises having a realistic plan of transformation. Karel Bednar is convinced that a debt capitalization can be imposed by the government only on a Bank of Commerce that is wholly state-controlled.

*** Csurka Increases Attacks on Antall Government**

*** Hungarian Way Rally Speech**

93CH0672A Budapest MAGYAR FORUM in
Hungarian 6 May 93 p 19

[Article by (b): "Hungarian Way Forum With Istvan Csurka at Nagydorog; To Be at Home in Our Homeland"]

[Text] On the last day of April, the gymnasium of the Nagydorog elementary school was filled to overflowing. A good number of people came from surrounding villages, as well, to hear Istvan Csurka and express their sympathy for the Hungarian Way movement. Istvan Csurka first spoke to the audience about why we are dissatisfied with the events of the past three years. We primarily reproach those in power for the failure of justice and the difficulty to acquire property.

In a realistic analysis, the speaker evaluated the time since the 1990 election and asserted that the fact that we live in a free country where an opinion contrary to that of the government can be uttered should be considered a huge accomplishment. We have not been so free for many decades, Istvan Csurka emphasized. Thus, we should be happy. Why is there still no happiness? Because our entire life is insecure. And he gave a few questions which are present in all of our minds: Why can we not create conditions in which we can feel at home? Is this the change of regime? According to the politicians in power, this is it. But the majority whose life has barely changed say no, this is not what they wanted.

We Are the Issue!

Something happened to us which looks good, but we also sense a certain falsehood and defenselessness which was our lot before, as well. The people expected that after the change of regime the slogan "The country is ours!", which so far has only been a communist lie, will become reality. But this is not what happened. The old wish to be at home in our own homeland did not come true. The members of the present government do not think of fulfilling the wish of the people; a fight for positions is in progress among the political elite, the members of which, having surfaced in the so-called change of regime, begin to look more and more like the "experts" of the old order in their behavior and political practices.

The Goal Is National Union

Whoever openly declares to be Hungarian today in Hungary will be subject to mudslinging and epithets. This is why the leadership of the largest party is trying to exclude the participants of the Hungarian Way, and this is why the Hungarian Way Foundation does not receive a penny from the budget while everyone else does. But we can rightly ask, why was it not the Hungarian government that started a foundation called Hungarian Way? The change of regime must be completed, the speaker concluded, because the change up to now is not enough. The Hungarian Way movement motivates and calls on everyone to start anew, to make changes; its primary goal is to unite Hungarians

who can and want to do something for this country. With its short history up to now, the Hungarian Way proved that it is not true that we are indifferent; it is not true that we are not interested in our own fate. The people of the country rose up because they feel, they know that the stake is huge. The question to be decided now is whether there will be a new force which keeps the inherent demands of the Hungarian people alive.

In 1994, the Hungarian Way will demand, among other things, to complete the restitution of property and correct its faults. It will fight against Hungarian land and Hungarian banks becoming the property of foreigners. The Hungarian Way wants to break with the current cowardly economic policy which is a direct continuation of the practice of the Communists, and is a defenseless pawn of the World Bank. According to Istvan Csurka, an economic policy must be conducted in which, even at the risk of a larger budget deficit, the development of infrastructure can begin; that is to say, roads, bridges, telephone lines would be constructed, at the same time creating jobs.

Hard Struggle

The Hungarian Way movement does not promise an easy road to those who join us, Istvan Csurka concluded in his speech in Nagydorog; a hard struggle is awaiting us, and our only weapons are publicity and honest speech.

*** Antall 'Political Prisoner'**

93CH0672B Budapest MAGYAR FORUM in
Hungarian 13 May 93 p 5

[Interview with attorney Dr. Laszlo Nagy, a founder and former member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Krisztina Toth; place and date not given: "The Shadow Government Is in Charge"]

[Text] When I looked up Dr. Laszlo Nagy in the Buda Environs Law Offices, I wanted to interview the attorney alone. However, after our conversation, it appeared again that it will be more worthwhile to introduce the politician Dr. Laszlo Nagy, who is "incidentally" a successful attorney, as well.

[Toth] Mr. Attorney, you are not only a member of the Independent Committee to Protect Transylvania and the long-term legal counsel of the Gabor Bethlen Foundation, but also one of the founding members of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. However, this is a thing of the past. For what reason did you leave the organization?

[Nagy] The main reason was the deterioration of the good political and human relationship I had with Sandor Csoori in the course of the activities of the Gabor Bethlen Foundation. On the other hand, the situation within the MDF also played a role in my decision. In my opinion, the tragic disintegration of the MDF is not caused by Istvan Csurka, as many people believe, but rather by the great coalition which Jozsef Antall conducts in secret. Namely, in Hungary a politics of great coalition is functioning, directed by a shadow government. Antall is at most one of its leaders, but it is also possible that he is only a simple member. And this shadow government is operating under the aegis of the

MDF. If this were not the case, it would be incomprehensible not only for Antall, but also for an uneducated prime minister, to appoint people to lead the individual portfolios who are not representatives of the given professions, but Antall still put them there. That the appointments are such can only have one reason. Namely, that the intention dictated by the shadow government could be implemented freely. Because if, for instance, I want to make my government functional, I would appoint exclusively ministers who deliver excellent work. In my opinion, Antall is, willy-nilly, building a power in Hungary with an approach foreign to us, and his appointments prove his affinity to this line.

The Prime Minister Is a Political Prisoner

At the moment there is a background cooperation between the Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], the Association of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and one of the remnants of the MDF, which is actually operating in opposition to the coalition, while the "government coalition" is only a penniless "ragged army." The task of this ever-widening "ragged army" which is slowly coming to its senses is to recapture the main power of Hungary with their bare hands, faced with "the weapons of capital." It is especially significant that even among the forces of the left there are respectable people who, individually, are excellent Hungarians and highly qualified professionals, and can be included in the circle of political technocrats. The country must be "recaptured" with their assistance, as well. Such a personality whom I respect, for instance, is the movie director Ferenc Kosa, but I could name others.

It is a fact that the external sovereignty of Hungary is more or less functional, but its internal sovereignty has not been restored.

[Toth] In your opinion, with what chances can the MDF face the 1994 election?

[Nagy] I do not want to make predictions, but Antall and his group must decide if it is worth continuing cooperation with the people surrounding them. Personally, I consider Antall to be a "political prisoner" who does not have enough courage to take a step toward valuable national forces or to sit down and negotiate with them. I do not want to say with what rationale, but the MDF drove away excellent national forces from its camp under Antall's presidency. And when the Csurka camp also leaves the MDF, the number of the remaining members will be negligible.

[Toth] Thus, the fall of the MDF must inevitably happen?

[Nagy] No. The former founders of the MDF and those who were driven away from the party will be the force, in my opinion, which will again elevate the Forum into the Hungarian center. What exists now is not the MDF, in any sense. It is even less a center. There is, for instance, not a single charismatic or creative person in it. And Csurka was simply banned to the periphery. This is like scoring a goal for your opponents.

[Toth] As an active attorney and an active politician, how significant do you think it is that the well-known statements

of former police Lieutenant-Colonel Gyula Illes and his companions were turned into a notarized document?

[Nagy] I know a lot more about Gyula Illes and his companions than anyone could guess. And I know not only about the leading officers, but also about the various "games" and the chain of events behind the officers. However, because of the legal confidentiality I am bound by in connection with the group in question, I cannot talk about it now. However, my first version of this case is that the whole thing is a trap based on a well-written scenario. Incidentally, in this case one must not start with persons, but rather with the question of what purpose their activity serves. This is the key issue here.

Radical Purge!

As far as I know, there are much dirtier issues in the secret service than the break-in at the Smallholders Party headquarters on Belgrade quay.

[Toth] Speaking of the secret service, according to an interview you gave to ELSO KEZBOL in 1990, after 1988 you had accurate information on the activity, or rather, as you called it, failure, of the Securitate [Romanian Secret Service] in Romania and Hungary. After the article was published, didn't anyone think of the possibility that this information might be a state secret?

[Nagy] I was not particularly interested in what the authorities thought of the information I had. I had, have, and will have, a completely independent information network. I can also tell you that it works much better than that of the authorities, and they are aware of this, too. It is a fact that the infiltration of foreign interests in Hungarian public and political life has taken on great proportions. For this reason, a radical purging will be necessary.

My point of view in this respect is the following: People who relocated in Hungary from Transylvania or Felvidek ["Upper Country"—northern Hungary until 1920, now Slovakia] should be able to attain high public office or become employees of an organization with such a profile only after a certain amount of time. I consider the degree of openness which is currently practiced in connection with relocated people inadmissible from the point of view of protecting Hungarians, as well as from a strategic and security point of view.

Otherwise we surrender Hungarian interests of overriding importance to foreign forces. This statement does not concern concrete persons, although I could mention a few. The porous "defense doctrine" which means the elimination of Hungarian immunity is inadmissible!

The Transylvanian Issue

[Toth] Part of the truth is that for your political statements you have been called many things so far. When were you proclaimed to be a fascist and an anti-Semite?

[Nagy] First of all, in connection with the issue of anti-Semitism, one must say that the accusation of being anti-Semitic was applied to Hungarians in general. At a time when neither Istvan Csurka, nor Laszlo Nagy, nor others have yet appeared on the scene. When, however, the signs

of a change of regime characterized by Hungarian interests were discernible, the general accusation was transferred to concrete persons. In connection with my person, here is an example. When the Transylvanian issue, that is to say, the wave of refugees, reached Hungary, I rescued not only ethnic Hungarians, but others, as well. I defended Romanians, Gypsies, Saxons, Swabians [both ethnic Germans]; moreover, Transylvanian Jews who applied to me were also not turned down. With no regard to holidays, they came to my office even at night; groups of 80-90 persons stood in line. As a whisper, it was spread about me that I was an irredentist, a nationalist, a chauvinist. This was spread unquestionably by the Romanian secret service and forces cooperating with them. These organizations obviously have their people in Hungary, as well.

I was concretely "declared to be an anti-Semite" when a group in a so-called oppositional apartment on the seventh floor on Mester street decided to occupy a Roman Catholic church in Budapest with the inclusion of representatives of Romanian refugees. The details were worked out by a person who relocated from Romania. According to the plans, after the church was to be occupied, the participants would declare to representatives of the Western press, who had been summoned ahead of time, that in Hungary there is great discrimination in refugee matters to the detriment of Romanians and other "foreigners."

However, someone's conscience stirred, and I was called to the scene. In front of the others I asked Mr. Roska, the leader of ethnic Romanian refugees, whether I had established the connection between the Szuros group of the Central Committee [of the Communist Party] and the representatives of Romanians who relocated in Hungary. I also asked if they all received the necessary support from the Red Cross. From his replies it became immediately apparent to everyone that there was no discrimination of any kind, even in their case. Thus I immediately swept this dirty political provocation from the table, but this was the first time I was labeled an anti-Semite. For the reason that the gentlemen who wrote this scenario were mostly Jews.

When Did I Become a Fascist?

Their leader, whom I mentioned already, pretended to be a Jew, and later represented Hungarian Jewry before international organizations. However, according to our information, he came from a family of peasants around Nagyvarad [Oradea]. To make the deception complete, he tried to prove his Jewishness with his looks, and even grew an appropriate beard, but he has never been an Israelite.

And I "became" a fascist when I was allowed to direct the demonstration which displayed the most wonderful national unity, the great Transylvania demonstration; I participated in the work of the organizing committee. In preparation for the provocation to be expected, we had to put together a very stepped-up scenario. We had to pay special attention to the display of national symbols. In order to avoid violence, we thought that neither German, nor Romanian refugees should march under their national

flags, and correspondingly, the presence of the Hungarian flag should be only minimal and only to the extent necessary.

However, five minutes before the start of the demonstration, the above-mentioned gentleman and his group appeared on Hosok square with Romanian national flags. At my instruction it was possible to stop them and fortunately no violence occurred. But next day, that certain member of the same group labeled me and my co-organizers fascists at their international press conference in Cafe Lukacs.

In order to condemn us, they distributed fliers to the journalists. We "became" fascists because we did not allow the Romanian flags to be taken to the monuments of the seven chieftains, in accordance with the previous agreement we made with them and which they ignored.

We Have Civilian Diplomacy

[Toth] In your own opinion, what was the most obvious eliciting factor for the serious accusations against you?

[Nagy] In the course of the Communist mechanism, the Hungarian and Romanian secret services cooperated. When the Romanian secret agents swarmed out to Hungary, the Hungarian secret service was obliged to act as their managers. The Hungarians sent them out several times in order to represent Hungarian interests. Well, they did not do it. It has always been key events and watersheds that decided where someone stood. My condemnation is also the work in this line. They cooperated because—and this was a great surprise to me—next to the Hungarian secret service and the Hungarian official diplomacy, we also established a professionally operating and very influential civilian diplomacy. The opportunity for this was created by emigration. I took this step miles before Hungarian diplomacy. I can declare without seeming to be immodest that I also had an influence on certain decisions in Central Europe. And particularly that the Moscow-Berlin-Tokyo axis, which in my opinion is injurious, not be established, and that Hungary finally occupy its proper place in international politics on the boundary of the two great camps.

[Toth] What position do you imagine Hungary will be able to attain in Europe within the short term?

[Nagy] In my opinion, a realistic prognosis is that within five years Hungary will be the most stable political and economic medium-sized power of Central Europe, the epicenter of cooperation in the Carpathian basin.

*** Danube Circle Levels Charges Against Government**

93CH0684A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
18 May 93 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Damming up the Old Danube; Duna Circle: Different Decisions by Parliament and Government"]

[Text] The water-recharge plan for Szigetkoz accepted by the government (originally as a confidential decree) is

contrary to Parliament's 1991 decisions, as several environmental protection organizations and parliamentary representatives claimed of late. Most recently the Duna Circle announced that they will appeal to the Constitutional Court in the matter.

Changing the course of the Danube resulted in a dramatic drop in the water table in Szigetkoz; the backwaters which receive little water as it is, are in a catastrophic situation; the vegetation of the inundation area suffered damage. It was primarily local water management experts who were urging some kind of a solution for water recharge. In its confidential decree of 22 April the government actually accepted the proposal of Gyor water management experts. According to this, in the region of Dunakiliti the level of the Old Danube would be dammed up with the help of a bottom sill and the shipping sluice of the already completed dam. This would raise the level of the water table and supply the system of backwaters with water.

Gyorgy Droppa, manager of the Duna Circle told us that in their opinion the government's plan is in opposition to two decisions by parliament. On the one hand with the one which declares that on the Hungarian reaches of the Danube we will not dam up the water. On the other hand, it is contrary to the decision according to which Hungary will not put into operation any of the major projects of the Bos [Gabcikovo]-Nagymaros system of dams, and the Dunakiliti dam is a major part of this project.

On the request of Environmental Minister Laszlo Gyurko, Dr. Laszlo Valki, a professor of law, also examined the question. He also thought that the decisions by the government and parliament are opposed to each other.

"We don't deny that parliament has the right to modify an earlier decision, but the government must not make a decision opposed to it," Droppa declared. He told us that they completed their appeal to the Constitutional Court and it was mailed before midnight.

*** Ukraine's Hungarians Organize, Evaluate Treaty**

*** Program, Stance Debated**

93CH0707A Uzhhorod IGaz SZO in Hungarian 11 May 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Board of Directors Meets at Berehove"]

[Text] The new board of directors elected at the fourth general meeting of the KMKSZ [Cultural Association of Subcarpathian Hungarians] held its first meeting in Beregszasz [Berehove]. The agenda included the finalizing and adoption of the Association's program, the election of chairmen for the ethics and audit committees, as well as debate over the position the Association should take at the 15 May conference of the Democratic League of Nationalities in the Subcarpathians (KNDL), and other current issues.

The KMKSZ program proposed at the fourth general meeting sparked little debate; the board adopted the

essence of the program without significant change. Only one aspect of the program evoked heavy debate: Is the KMKSZ the sole interest group representing Subcarpathian Hungarians? In the end, the different views were reconciled by incorporating the following wording in the program: the KMKSZ is "the sole, general interest group."

There were no differences of opinion regarding the chairmen of the ethics and audit committees. Munkacs [Mukacheve] physician Istvan Majorossy, also a representative of the county council, became the chairman of the ethics committee, and Sandor Stefan, an educator from Tiszaújfal [Vylok] the chairman of the audit committee.

Steering Committee member Miklos Kovacs reported on the relationship between the KMKSZ and the KNDL. Ha said that as of recently, not a single meeting called to reconcile interests had a quorum, representatives of the Association were not invited to some of the meetings, and no voting mechanism has been established. Ivan Turjanica, the chairman of the Society of Ruthenians in the Subcarpathians also spoke. He emphasized that under the present political conditions cooperation between the various nationalities of the Subcarpathians was needed, i.e., that cooperation by the League was also necessary. Neither the KMKSZ executive committee, nor its board of directors questioned the truth of this statement, nevertheless the two bodies stressed that participation in the League made sense only if the KMKSZ controlled the decisions of the League, i.e., if it had veto powers. A 10-member committee composed of the KMKSZ executive committee and its political secretary was elected to represent the interests of the KMKSZ at the League's general meeting.

Other debated issues of special importance included the Ukrainian-Hungarian basic interstate agreement. In due regard to the sensitive nature of this issue, the executive committee proposed, and the board of directors ordered that the meeting be closed, and that the public and the press be excluded. At their own requests, the board authorized the following persons to be present at the closed meeting: Sandor Povazsai, the consul of the Hungarian Republic at Ungvar [Uzhhorod]; Tibor Szabo, the division director heading the Office of Hungarians Beyond the Borders; and National Assembly Representative Gyula Zacssek, on a fact-finding tour of the Subcarpathians on behalf of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum].

The board of directors approved the text of a communique at the conclusion of the closed meeting.

*** Statement on Treaty**

93CH0707B Uzhhorod IGaz SZO in Hungarian 11 May 93 p 1

[Undated statement issued by the board of directors of the Cultural Association of Sub-Carpathian Hungarians: "Announcement"]

[Text] A number of conflicting reports surfaced regarding the Ukrainian-Hungarian basic agreement, and the

KMKSZ's view of the agreement. Therefore the county board regards providing authentic information to the membership to be important.

Unfortunately, our Association was unable to participate in the development of the Ukrainian-Hungarian basic agreement, signed about a year and a half ago. Despite this fact, as an organization of Sub-Carpathian Hungarians that pursues responsible political discourse, the KMKSZ recognizes the need for and significance of an appropriate basic agreement between the two countries. Correspondingly, members of the KMKSZ executive committee wrote letters to both the prime minister of Hungary and the president of Ukraine.

The KMKSZ wishes to express hope that its proposals are going to be the subjects of far-reaching consideration in the future regarding the enforcement of basic principles contained in agreements between our countries, and that the parties to the agreement provide appropriate guarantees for our participation in developing specific steps.

The KMKSZ Board of Directors

*** KMKSZ Letter to Antall**

*93CH0707C Uzhhorod IGaz SZO in Hungarian 11
May 93 p 2*

[Letter to Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall by Sandor Fodo, president of the Cultural Association of Sub-Carpathian Hungarians, dated 8 April 1993 and sent from Uzhhorod in Ukraine: "KMKSZ Letter to Prime Minister Jozsef Antall"]

[Text]

Highly Respected Mr. Prime Minister!

On behalf of the KMKSZ membership, and of the Sub-Carpathian Hungarian people, as well as on my own behalf, I wish to thank you for your warm greetings addressed to our fourth general meeting. We regard your message, Mr. Prime Minister, as a manifestation of your continued concern for the fate of Sub-Carpathian Hungarians. The KMKSZ, as the sole interest group representing Sub-Carpathian Hungarians, has stressed a number of times the significance it attributed to strengthening balanced, good neighborly relations between Ukraine and Hungary, even more so because such relations contribute greatly to the expansion of political, economic and cultural opportunities enjoyed by Sub-Carpathian Hungarians.

The development of relations between Ukraine and Hungary enabled attempts to reach an open, negotiated settlement of the nationality issue, a subject heretofore treated as taboo, not in the least due to the involvement of the affected parties.

Endeavors by the two governments to overcome emerging difficulties based on mutual agreements, in the spirit of the Helsinki Accord, represent a positive development. The establishment of an intergovernmental joint committee also appears to be promising; this committee has as its main

purpose providing substance that is acceptable to nationalities, consistent with a European framework declared by the parties to the agreement, and unique.

We are convinced that despite its deficiencies, the declaration concerning relations between the two countries signed in 1991 has contributed to the enactment of a Ukrainian minority law whose quality can be measured in terms of European standards.

Accords and bilateral agreements signed by Ukraine and Hungary may be regarded as significant milestones in the development of relations between the two countries. The appropriate Ukrainian-Hungarian basic agreement has special significance among these. Beyond recognizing the mutuality and importance of the values stated in these documents, these accords and agreements also prove that both parties intend to ensure the coexistence of our peoples pursuant to European and international standards, even though all issues cannot in the least be regarded as settled insofar as Sub-Carpathian Hungarians are concerned.

In supporting these efforts of the Ukrainian and Hungarian Governments, we also intend to participate in deepening the good relations between the two countries, in the settlement of problems experienced by Sub-Carpathian Hungarians, and in the development of realistic alternatives. The preparedness of the two governments to provide support, and the support of this Federation's membership could guarantee the success of our activities. With our proposals we would like to continue to help resolve concerns stemming from minority existence. We believe that this is in the interest of not only neighboring states and governments, but also of a people that share a common fate, and thus also of Europe.

Aware of the significance of peaceful coexistence, of the need to pursue sober, well-considered politics in the interest of the Hungarian people, and in hopes of further constructive cooperation,

I remain, sincerely,

Sandor Fodo, President

Ungvar, 8 April 1993

*** TV Problems, Media Center Discussed**

*93CH0703B Budapest HETI MAGYARORSZAG in
Hungarian 4 Jun 93 p 3*

[Article by Hungarian Democratic Forum Representative Zoltan Speidl, published under the rubric "Parliamentary Corridor"]

[Text] Indications are that in two short years at most, the word "Hungarian," as part of the name of Hungarian Television [MTV], will be omitted. A communique issued by MTV's new leadership and facts presented by PESTI HIRLAP confirm this to be true.

The communique has, in part, this to say: "Under the leadership of the management that was in charge until January 1993, MTV was transferred into alien hands. The word 'alien' is not used here in a pejorative sense; it

conveys a fact. Since 1990, MTV's interests have suffered a series of violations, through unfavorable contracts MTV has spun a web around itself which placed it, as a national public service television, in a position of dependence." The communique states that while in 1992 MTV received an unprecedented amount of 15 billion forints [Ft] in revenues, (one-third the amount needed to provide wage increases for almost 1 million public officials and public employees), it left behind a legacy of Ft1.5 billion in unpaid bills to be settled by the new management. "Outsiders dispose" over the programming time of MTV, and MTV "is forced to expend its money to finance programs which do not serve, or do not serve its own programming policy well."

Here are a few facts based on the evidence revealed, as well as a few questions. TV1's entire advertising time has been sold in advance for the next 10 years (!), and an unusually high, 20-25 percent commission was paid. These advertising revenues were not paid directly to MTV, but to a firm authorized to sell advertising time. Question: Is there going to be enough advertising time left to protect Hungarian products? Who benefitted from this business and how?

The Saturday evening prime time hours of TV1 have been committed for the next two years to the presentation of movies from overseas. Even the starting time for these broadcasts has been determined by outsiders. Question: In whose interest is it to inundate the audience with the most trashy—primarily U.S.—"culture" at prime time? Quite obviously, I am not agitating against those few movies that are of real value. Values are not specific from the standpoint of any nation.

Who reaped how large a profit from presenting U.S. films to Hungarian viewers at prices that amounted to multiples of those shown in international catalogs? Could this web of interests disintegrate [and disappear] at some point in time? What is the explanation for the old MTV leadership's—i.e., the reputable Elemer Hankiss and company's—failure to collect receivables to which the television is justly entitled?

We could go on and on listing questions and facts. But another television issue also exists, one that is linked to those calling themselves liberals. This case involves the Budapest media center to be established by Gabor Demszky and his allies. True, Ivan Peto smiled when reassuring viewers of OSSZTUZ that creating an SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] TV was out of question. Nevertheless, after reviewing the list of founders and certain information, according to which Gyorgy Soros is also interested in this affair, we are bothered by the thought that we have some kind of a party medium at hand.

The feverish rush could not be explained, were it not for some partisan interest, and for founders having the approaching elections in mind. The rush would otherwise be inexplicable, because broadcasts are being beamed to Budapest. Cable television operates in the various districts. Moreover, even the newspapers with national circulation, so to speak, are published primarily in Budapest, because, according to circulation figures, most copies are sold in

Budapest. And the argument according to which both MTV and Hungarian Radio are centered around Budapest is also true. So then, what is the real motivating force behind this feverish haste to establish the media center?

Further, I ask: Isn't there a better way to spend these several hundreds (or who knows how many) of millions of forints earmarked for this purpose? I raise this question because both independent and nonindependent experts once said after changing the management at MTV and the radio: "Come on now, the electronic media are not going to be decisive in determining the events of the near future." Why the great rush, if this true? Why invest several hundreds of millions of forints at a time when the local government is raising public transportation fares, when water mains burst and flood the streets of Budapest with cool water, when no 100-year-old moth-eaten winter coat looks as decrepit like many streets of Budapest, and when one need not even go to the outer districts of Budapest to find such streets. And I ask yet another question: Wouldn't it be better to use this money to create workplaces? Or could it be that the Budapest mayor's office espouses the same view as my small town deputy mayor (also from the SZDSZ) when he heard of some problem to be resolved: "It doesn't matter, in the worst case, the government is going to fail!"

I call the attention of several individuals to the fact that in this case not only the government, but the entire country might fail.

* Provisions of New Criminal Code Detailed

93CH0684E Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
17 May 93 p 6

[Article by Andras Sereg: "New Criminal Code Regulations, From Public Service to Kidnapping"]

[Text] On 15 May, the modified criminal code took effect. The shortest term of imprisonment was reduced to one day, and the maximum fine was increased to 3,600,000 forints [Ft]. There are changes in the system of punishments: educational hard labor and corrective training are discontinued, and public service is a novelty. Eleven new crimes were added to the criminal code.

On 2 March 1993 parliament amended the 1978 criminal code. In the future, beyond war crimes and crimes against humanity, more serious cases of homicide (for instance, murder committed with unusual cruelty), kidnapping, terrorist acts, and taking control of airplanes (hijacking) will no longer be subject to a term of limitation. After the death penalty, further major punishments (corrective training and educational hard labor) were eliminated from the criminal code. A new punishment is public service. This, in contrast to educational hard labor, does not curtail the personal freedom of the convicted individual, but is also different from corrective training which was nothing more than a fine paid in installments. The shortest period of imprisonment was reduced to one day from three months. The smallest fine was increased to Ft500, and the maximum fine to Ft3,600,000.

The regulation according to which the confiscation of property can only serve the purpose of diverting profit which the perpetrator obtained through a crime conforms to European norms.

Hungarian legislation abolished the crime called prostitution. This, however, does not mean that in the future all is fair, because at the same time punishments for the so-called parasitic crimes were increased. Someone who maintains a bordello can count on five years of prison instead of the former three.

The fines for petty offenses were increased. The lowest amount was increased to Ft100, the highest, from Ft20,000 to Ft50,000.

The amounts determining modifying circumstances were also modified. For instance, before 15 May, theft of an item of greater value occurred if the value of the item was between Ft10,000 and Ft100,000. This time, the "greater value" is between Ft200,000 and Ft1,000,000. Considerable value which, up to now, was defined as Ft100,000 to Ft1,000,000, can mean in the future as much as Ft5,000,000. And theft of an item of exceptional value begins with Ft5,000,000.

Eleven new crimes were added to the criminal code. A new crime on the scene is kidnapping, for which the law threatens two to eight years of imprisonment in a basic case. Unauthorized data management and abuse of special personal data are also new crimes.

Offenses against national symbols: Someone who makes remarks publicly which offend or denigrate the national anthem, flag, or coat of arms of the Hungarian Republic, or commits other similar crimes, can be punished with imprisonment of up to one year, public service, or a fine.

Threatening with public danger: If someone makes an untrue claim in front of other people which is suitable to disturb public peace, such as the threat of an event which signifies danger to the public (for instance, an impending bomb explosion), can be sentenced to three years in prison for seriously disturbing public peace.

The crime called noncompliance with obligations in connection with the distribution of internationally controlled substances and technologies applies primarily to the protection of products on the COCOM list. And if someone defrauds an authority or person entitled to make decisions with the intent of financial gain, and thus unlawfully obtains for himself economic benefits provided by the state, he can be punished with imprisonment for up to five years.

Tax and social insurance fraud: Keeping secrets from not only the tax authority, but also from social insurance, qualifies as a crime if income is decreased by at least Ft50,000. Noncompliance with the obligation to pay employer's and employee's contributions to the Unemployment Solidarity Fund and to social insurance, health insurance, and the retirement fund is also punishable.

Transgressions against copyright and similar rights: Contrary to the prior petty offense sanctions, the basic act will

qualify as a misdemeanor, but it is punishable with imprisonment up to five years if the transgression against copyright and similar rights (such as those of performers) is committed with the intent of unusually great financial gain.

The criminal regulations concerning drug offenses were changed, as well. The preparation, requisition, and distribution of narcotics continues to be punishable, but an individual who produces, prepares, or consumes a small amount of narcotics for his own use cannot be punished if by the time of the sentence of the first degree he submits proof that he is in treatment for the prevention or cure of drug dependence for six months.

A stricter punishment awaits those who offend authorities or official persons: In the basic case, the upper limit of the punishment was increased from one year to two years. If the act is committed in public, the maximum is three years imprisonment instead of two. The punishment for taking the law into one's own hands has become very strict. Earlier, the individual could be punished with imprisonment up to one year; after 15 May, the upper limit of the punishment has increased fivefold, to five years.

* Free Democrat Denounces Use of Foundations

93CH0684D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
17 May 93 p 4

[Unattributed report on a presentation given by Karoly Attila Soos, parliamentary representative of the Alliance of Free Democrats, in Hajduszoboszlo on 14 May 1993: "Transfer Into 'Private Foundations' Is Misappropriation"]

[Text] Karoly Attila Soos, representative of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], held a forum in Hajduszoboszlo Friday night [14 May] entitled "Foundations or Salvaged Power?" The parliamentary chairman's finance committee said that the transfer of state moneys into "private foundations" is nothing other than misappropriation.

Karoly Attila Soos also talked about the fact that through certain foundations state moneys end up in party accounts. The clause in the founding documents, according to which the foundations must account for their activities once a year, is not enough to control the problem, the representative said. Soos added that in the case of the foundation to support Duna TV or the one for the freedom of culture there is no guarantee for neutrality to the parties. He called the transfer of certain real estate to foundations illegal, and in connection with the Lakitelek Foundation, he remarked that self-respecting foundations make their financial information public.

In reply to a question by the Debrecen radio station, he said that if his party took office, a part of the foundations which operate with doubtful capital would atrophy and others would be turned into public foundations.

The current method, according to which the foundations are used for government propaganda or for winning people over to the governing parties, will not be a feasible route, the Free Democrat representative declared in Hajduszoboszlo.

* Provisions of Education Draft Law Detailed

93CH0684C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
18 May 93 p 16

[Unattributed interview with Krisztina Dobos, deputy state secretary at the Ministry of Culture and Education; place and date not given: "The Goal Is a 10-Grade School"]

[Text] The bills on elementary and secondary education, vocational training, and the regulation of higher education were put in the representatives' work folder for this week as the product of almost three-fourths of a year's worth of work and several hundred hours of coordination. Knowing the various opinions, it is not hard to predict that from the "triple" law on education, the greatest dispute is expected about the first one—on public education—which is natural, after all, since it deals with the basis of our education which concerns approximately 1.5 million students.

According to quite a few people, the bill on public education is ill-advised; it regulates too much and too little at the same time, and thus it must not be passed in its present form. Others, however, think that it could lead to a modern educational system on a European level and needs only minor modifications. In our panorama we will attempt to introduce the bill from as many points of view as possible: as it is seen by its drafters, and by the representatives of various professional groups and organizations for the protection of various interests.

We asked Krisztina Dobos, deputy under secretary at the Ministry of Culture and Education, director of the preparatory work on the public education bill, which elements of the bill she considers to be the most important.

[Dobos] "I am convinced that we will take the largest step by introducing the compulsory 10-grade elementary school, if the Honorable House passes it," she said. "The expansion of learning, the raising of the level of general education, is a demand of the times. In Europe, too, a nine- or 10-grade school has become prevalent. Here in Hungary, the changing economy, the increasingly complicated professional structure, demands from the schools a workforce which, because of its broader range of knowledge, can be trained in several directions and then retrained and educated further. For this reason, in the following decades the prestige of the high-school final examination will increase, as well as the prestige of schools providing this qualification, and also the number of their students, because the high-school final examination will become largely the entrance requirement for the institutions of higher education. I consider it to be a very important element of the bill that as a result of the extended general education, the students will not be forced in the future to choose a vocation at 14, rather they will have time to do so at 16, when they are more mature to make a decision."

[NEPSZABADSAG] According to contrary opinions, the prerequisites for the 10-grade elementary school are not present in the country, and thus one cannot make it compulsory. Many people also object to the fact that this

bill gives a green light to too many kinds of schools, and thus the structure of education becomes complicated and incomprehensible.

[Dobos] The 10-grade school structure doesn't mean that every eight-grade school must be transformed into a 10-grade school, because compulsory education can be complied with in various types of schools. For those who do not go on to secondary school, the 10-grade elementary education is compulsory, after which, if the student changes his mind, he can later complete any secondary school. The ninth and tenth grade can be organized by an elementary school, but also by a vocational school. Because of the current and expected decrease in the number of students, in many schools it must not be too great a problem to make room for two classes. And the structure of education will not be more complicated than now, because at the time of preparing the plan, we considered every type of school that exists today. Among the approximately 5,000 elementary and secondary schools there are only a few hundred on the six-plus-six or the four-plus-eight system, thus their number is not a determining factor. With the help of the self-governments and regional educational centers, a healthy proportion can be established; namely, the goal is to have some of each type of school in each county, so that people have a choice. Which one will survive in the long run will be decided not by law, but by the demand of society.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Because the national basic curriculum has not yet been developed, many people feel there is no guarantee that transfer between the schools will be possible.

[Dobos] The national basic curriculum is being prepared on new grounds, but one thing can be known for certain already, that with unified examinations the equivalence among the many schools can be realized. Two examinations will be compulsory. The basic examination at the end of the tenth grade will have to be passed by those who do not want to go on, and the high-school final examination will have to be passed at the end of secondary school. Beyond these, an evaluation of basic skills at the end of fourth or fifth grade might be important; this will be a so-called internal evaluation by the school, and will not be included in the child's report card. This is essentially a signal for the school and for the parents about how far the child advanced and how far one can build on his basic knowledge. An assessment or qualifying examination may be required by certain secondary schools, as well, if the student wants to continue his studies there after the fourth, sixth, or eighth grade.

[NEPSZABADSAG] One of the major objections to the bill is that with the introduction of tuition, education will no longer be free, and in this way it is difficult to talk about compulsory education.

[Dobos] For the time of school age, that is to say, up to the age of 16, for those in secondary school, up to the high-school final examination, or to the attainment of the first vocation, the education of children is free; that is to say, for basic services, basic care, the school cannot charge tuition. However, it can charge tuition for additional services, for

fulfilling special demands. This is the way it is now, only it is not called tuition. And this is the way it is in more developed countries, as well.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Do those who cannot complete the 10 grades by the time they are 16 have to pay?

[Dobos] Up to the basic examination, or to the attainment of the final certificate, the school is free, even for a 20-year-old student. The main thing is that no child should be left out of compulsory education. It is the responsibility of self-governments to find an adequate solution for children with learning difficulties or disabilities.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Fairly many people claim that one of the weakest links of the bill is the issue of financing. It does not state clearly who bears the cost of reform, and so there is no guarantee that it can be implemented.

[Dobos] One must admit that financing is indeed one of the weakest links. Namely, the present normative financing is a necessary evil which corresponds to the present economic situation. It contains to the greatest part the salaries of teachers, to a lesser part operational expenses which, depending on the institution, cover approximately 65-80 percent of the actual costs. The rest must be raised by the self-governments. Because normative financing does not really state unequivocally whose responsibility financial support and operation is, we suggested that the salaries and benefits of teachers should be paid by the budget, and the costs of operation be paid by the self-governments, or other providers. In this way it can be made clear what everyone's tasks and responsibilities are. At the same time, this will protect the teacher as a person performing a civil service, who in this way will not be at the mercy of local circumstances.

[NEPSZABADSAG] If financing is the weakest link, what is the bill's strongest element?

[Dobos] The fact that decisions will be made where they become necessary, and with the participation of all those who are concerned. Perhaps the best example of this is the school council, which is the highest decisionmaking forum of the school, its parliament, so to speak, and everyone belongs to it who has a direct or indirect connection with the school or nursery school in question. In other words, the teachers, the patrons of the school, the parents, and representatives of the students. It can have a very beneficial effect if the patrons of the school and the parents see the school's daily problems not from the outside, but from the inside, in their process, and they can help solve them. In the last analysis it can help change attitudes, as well, to accept that teaching and educating is a common task in which beyond the school everyone concerned has his special task.

* Government Works Out Housing Construction Plan

93CH0684B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
18 May 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Government Plan: Twice as Many Apartments Can Be Built"]

[Text] The government worked out a housing construction plan after the implementation of which the number of apartments to be built could be doubled. According to the plan, 35-40,000 new apartments could be constructed. According to the government, stopping the deterioration of the reservoir of apartments is just as important a task as the construction of new apartments; thus, in the system of financing and assistance, construction, renovation, and modernization have equal emphasis.

Dr. Erzsebet Puszta, under secretary of state for welfare, and other government officials held a press conference yesterday in parliament.

Puszta said that at a joint meeting of the factions of the government coalition, the representatives decided that a government resolution consisting of 20 points be formulated. The government resolution, passed on 6 May, contains tasks to be worked out, and thus the first steps of the implementation of the plan must be taken in the second half of the year. Incidentally, the last date is 31 December.

Pal Cseh, department manager of the Financial Ministry, said that according to every analysis, the difference between incomes and the prices of condominiums and apartment rents make it impossible for people to buy a condominium from their income.

According to the plan, the current installment subsidy would be replaced by a so-called loan with deferred interest. This means that in the beginning the lenders would disperse with the payment of high interests, but the unpaid interest would increase the amount of the principal. Should the borrower's income increase, this would be reflected in increased installments.

We asked Magdolna Makra, assistant undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, about the conflict of interests between the portfolios concerned in the issue. She said that it was in the interests of every ministry that the population have acceptable housing, but their spheres of authority were different. Housing policy is the task of the Welfare Ministry; the self-government aspect is the realm of the Interior Ministry; the development of the system of financial support is the realm of the Finance Ministry; the legal regulations are being prepared jointly by the Interior Ministry and the Justice Ministry, while the management of property and area development is the task of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Area Development. The assistant undersecretary, in her capacity as the secretary of the interdepartmental committee set up by the government resolution, told our reporter that the Industrial Ministry was commissioned to develop an information base. The interdepartmental committee is expected to meet once a month, and its first task will be to examine the risks of housing loans, whether there are guarantees for the repayment of loans.

According to Dr. Aurel Varga, assistant undersecretary of the Interior Ministry, there is a connection between the housing construction plan and the bill on apartment rentals in front of parliament. (However, when asked, Pal Battha, first secretary of the Association of Apartment Tenants, denied this. In his opinion, from the point of view of social and financial policy, the plan will accomplish equality between the sectors, but the proposal of the Interior Ministry on the contractual rental relationship gave the self-governments 800,000 apartments without obligation.)

According to Mrs. Aurel Varga, the regulation attempts to promote the differentiated management of vacant apartments. This could be supplemented by a modification according to which the self-governments would have to reinvest the price of condominiums they sold in the housing sector. However, she added that a municipality which reinvests this amount, regroups its resources, but still cannot carry out its goals cannot be left alone. For this purpose the guarantee must be created.

*** Jurist Attacks New Economic Legislation**

93EP0277B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
(EVERYDAY LAW supplement) in Polish 21 May 93
p 12

[Interview with Jozef Okolski, chairman of the Trade Law Department at Warsaw University, by Joanna Kwiek-Pietrzykowska; place and date not given: "Various Concepts of the Commercial Code"]

[Text] [Kwiek-Pietrzykowska] Public opinion is rebelling against the impotence shown by the government in collecting taxes and prosecuting people who take advantage of loopholes in commercial, tax, and customs laws. That also is being felt by Sejm deputies, but can those hemorrhages be prevented by the laws they are proposing for a more secure economic order, such as the recent proposal to raise the required amount of initial capital and capital stock?

[Okolski] I understand and share those intentions because the principle of a secure economic order, which has been underestimated for so many years, is fundamental to economic law. That is why a secure economic order should be of concern to all legislators, and, from that standpoint, their initiatives deserve praise. Unfortunately, the means by which those objectives are tentatively being accomplished do not merit approval and point to a failure to understand the institutions that are thus to be reformed. The proposal you mentioned is one such example. Its authors believe that the initial capital of capitalized companies is a surety to creditors. Yet, contrary to its appellation, a joint-stock company—that is, a company with limited responsibility—is responsible with all of its assets, and it is only the responsibility of partners therein that is limited. A company's assets are much more important than its initial capital. In the laws of some countries, initial capital is termed start-up capital—that is, capital serving to activate an enterprise.

The capitalized company has been a prime mover of economic growth in many countries, including prewar Poland. Such proposals by lawmakers would mean destroying that kind of company and would continue, as it were, the very bad idea, which, unfortunately, has become a binding law, that partners are held liable with their personal property for the tax obligations of their companies.

The proposed raise in the minimum capitalization requirement to 400 million zlotys [Z] for limited partnerships will simply put many of them out of business and render impossible the operations of many small entrepreneurs for which this legal construct was created in the first place. Before the war, the minimum capital requirement for establishing a partnership was Z10,000, which was the equivalent of US\$2,000 or approximately 35 million present-day zlotys. In Germany at present, it requires 50,000 marks, which corresponds to some 10 times the average monthly wage in that country. The Z40 million required in Poland is thus within those bounds. Certainly, minimum initial capital should not exceed Z100 million. I do not believe that raising that minimum requirement to

Z400 million would secure any claims of the State Treasury; instead, it would only result in widespread cheating.

[Kwiek-Pietrzykowska] Often such capital does not actually exist, considering that the Commercial Code merely requires the deposition of declarations by the board of directors to the effect that the partners contributed the capital, without proof of it, before the company could be registered.

[Okolski] And what is going to happen now that the capital requirement is going to be raised tenfold? Of course, there exists the penalty for making false declarations, but why create machinery that would further compound the economic malaise?

In my opinion, making the companies more credible should be done in a different way, certainly not by such fragmentary revisions of an originally good legal act such as the Commercial Code.

[Kwiek-Pietrzykowska] The initial capital or capital stock of a company need not reflect its actual financial situation and creditworthiness. Shouldn't a more secure economic order be achieved then in ways other than by raising capital requirements?

[Okolski] One such way, which is, besides, consonant with the directives of European law, is the openness of all information concerning a company: information on all of its partners, its full name, its trademarks, and its financial statements, accessible to any potential customer. Of course, the amount of initial capital also provides important information on the intentions of the partners when establishing a company; for example, when it is Z10 million and the purpose is to build an airport, it can be seen at once that it is not a company meriting serious consideration.

[Kwiek-Pietrzykowska] The epidemic of bankruptcies that hurt creditors only to establish new companies right afterward needs to be somehow stopped.

[Okolski] Special forms of personal liability of partners should be promoted and resorted to only in justified cases, without destroying the company. That chiefly concerns the partners contributing a majority of the company's capital and, hence, having a decisive voice in the company and on the selection of the board of directors. That also applies chiefly to one-person companies, permitted by Polish law but, at the same time, hanging in a vacuum because there exist no regulations governing their operation and oversight, and the operating mechanisms of multipartner companies are by their very nature not germane to them. German courts of law, for example, quite often posit the personal liability of the majority or sole partner, especially if he is at the same time the manager of the company. At the same time, the responsibilities of the board of directors should be enhanced because it is they who make decisions and have complete information on the company's affairs.

[Kwiek-Pietrzykowska] Can a law protecting the economic order and providing for penalties produce positive results?

[Okolski] I am opposed to the overall penalization of private enterprise entailed in such a law; it bodes nothing

good. If any penalties should be introduced at all, they should be highly selective and reasonable.

[Kwiek-Pietrzykowska] In addition, the proposed law contains loopholes because, in referring to, for example, the considerable loss to the State Treasury, which must be caused if a person is to bear responsibility for the illegal exportation of foreign exchange, that provision by the same token becomes toothless. That is so because anyone who causes the Treasury to suffer a really great financial loss certainly can afford a good lawyer, who would prove that, while the funds involved were substantial, the actual loss to the Treasury was limited.

[Okolski] Yes, such regulations are indeed vague. What is the meaning, for example, of "a person attending to matters concerning the property of the State Treasury"? What a broad concept. Undoubtedly, that applies to a deputy who votes in favor of the budget law. Thus, that provision also applies to deputies, thereby creating a major misunderstanding, or, "whosoever, while a debtor, becomes insolvent by unwittingly wasting assets." That surely must have been a typographical error.

[Kwiek-Pietrzykowska] Yes, that is literally so stated in the law.

[Okolski] From a legal standpoint, that is utter nonsense. The squandering of assets must be deliberate in order to be culpable, and that involves Pauline claims serving to invalidate any disposal of assets performed so as to injure creditors. Traditional civil law operates with many instruments for bringing to justice dishonest merchants and businessmen. It has to be well known and understood, yet it was applied clumsily in the proposed law on a secure economic order.

[Kwiek-Pietrzykowska] That law was drafted by criminal-law experts, who are very proud of their solutions. Anyway, I do not doubt that that draft is going to become a binding law.

[Okolski] If that is so, it might be just as well to place behind bars anyone who wants to start a business of his own. Such a law will needlessly penalize all economic transactions.

[Kwiek-Pietrzykowska] You praised the Commercial Code, yet a special committee is working on a similar new code.

[Okolski] Given the accepted idea of unity of civil law, there is no need to create a separate commercial code. Thus, there will arise a law on companies that will comprise all of their types while at the same time adapting our regulations to the requirements of European law. I am taking part in the work of that committee. Our Polish law in that domain needs no major revisions, and any revision should be analyzed from the standpoint of its impact because a company is the fundamental form of business activity. At present, we want to transform about 8,000 enterprises into companies. In Germany, that was done automatically by a single legislative decision. It could be that they did not fully succeed in reaching their goal. In this country, that has not been possible. In the process of

privatization, what matters most is the stage of the transformation of a state enterprise into a company. We want to develop such companies. We are urging employees, workers, to invest in them. If, however, we are to pose such high capital requirements as those proposed by the Sejm deputies, we shall not reach our goal.

The proposal to raise capital requirements for new companies is proof of failure to understand the nature of a company. Historically viewed, the purpose of a company has been to mobilize the capital of small savers, people who are not affluent. The point is to cause them to invest their savings for a useful economic purpose while at the same time relieving them of the risk of ruin should they be personally responsible for the company's assets. And the company has been accomplishing its purpose and becoming an instrument for reviving the economy. Such a model of the company is very suitable for us. Yet, by introducing changes such as the above, we want to create a kind of bank guarantee for the payment of all obligations to the State Treasury. I think that was the objective of the authors of the proposal. Aside from the consideration that the State Treasury should not be excessively privileged, it should be borne in mind that all of our legislators are burdened by the postsocialist legacy of an instrumental treatment of the law, of a paternalist interpretation of the role of the state and the law, which is a misunderstanding in the presence of a market economy. Such paternalism consists in the belief that everything has to be regulated and that the state should be equipped with the proper instruments for caring over every customer and, in particular, over the State Treasury. Yet, in a market economy, greater freedom should be granted to participants in economic transactions.

[Kwiek-Pietrzykowska] What should be the position of the State Treasury in economic transactions?

[Okolski] The law should provide for equal treatment of all subjects. For nearly 50 years, state ownership had a privileged status. I need not expatiate on its consequences. The State Treasury is obviously a special institution and therefore, for example, tax or customs obligations toward it have priority in being executed. But, as far as civil and commercial law is concerned, there is no reason to grant the State Treasury privileged status, especially considering that there is no law in existence on the State Treasury, and it is not even known who represents it or to what extent. The absence of such a law greatly complicates the process of privatization, as often evidenced. Foreign clients encounter, above all, the difficulty of determining who should be party to negotiations—the voivodship governor, the minister for ownership transformations, the minister of industry, or the manager of an enterprise—because of a lack of knowledge about the power of any government official to represent the State Treasury. I have the depressing feeling that the absence of a law regulating the State Treasury is deliberate, and it is helpful to influential political and ministerial circles in making various decisions. But if we are to be really serious about a secure economic order, we must, above all, clearly settle the legal status of the owner of the greatest part of our national wealth.

*** Possible Government-Union Collusion Noted**

*93BA1024A Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 7
May 93 pp 1-5*

[Article by Mihai Cernat: "Did the Government and the Unions Strike a Bargain With Each Other?"]

[Text] A second protocol between the government and the unions was brought to the negotiating table, just 24 hours after the signing of the first document with its amendments, and laid atop all the previous variations and formulas designed to find, in the end, the path to agreement between the two sides engaged in these discussions.

In the meantime, the Fratia Confederation moved to a strike declaration (a general strike, perhaps, as its leaders have called it), with its sustainability open to discussion (as was noted when the strike was implemented) even amongst the unions which are part of the Confederation. The prudence of those which belong to the CNSLR [National Confederation of Free Romanian Trade Unions], Alfa and Ceres, organizations which approved a 48-hour delay in calling the strike, seems to have been the more inspired approach. Either that or, possibly, their desire to produce a conflict of similar resulting intractability, one still hard to calculate but easy to anticipate, turned out to be more keen. Morally "patronized" and logistically supported by the BNS [National Trade Union Bloc], the Metro Union of Free Trade Unions (with the exception of the locomotive engineers) rushed forward on their part, starting their strike even earlier and risking drastic legal sanctions. In any case, all the trade union organizations involved in this conflict did not miss this opportunity.

And, yes, it could even be said that there was a guarded, permanent outcome, maintaining that the political implications of the events that were played out have no political content, with the issues attacked and those defended, and, in fact, attained at any price, being and remaining those concerned with economic and social demands. Things, however, were subsequently complicated by the intervention of the opposition parties' statement-plea, which could be interpreted (and, nota bene, not by subtle analysts) as ambiguously as possible. In other words, it is possible that behind the scenes of these events, with the intention of raising a second motion for censure, one just might actually find these sides working in collusion, or that by profiting from the "opening" created by the unions, both sides also want to make some political hay, or... There is no need for us to split hairs right now. Such an approach did not play well with the unions (perhaps not with all of them). Once again, there was a suspicion of double-dealing concerning their strong statements about political noninvolvement. And I do not think there is such an "impression," at least regarding their later, favorable intentions.

Getting back, however, to the second protocol, the one that was designed to correct certain errors and shortcomings contained in the first document, we need to make several points. Accused of "rigidity, manipulation and untruths" and of "insincerity in negotiations" and duplicity, the government has proved and reality has confirmed that it is ready to find "the way out of the dark" as fast as possible in

the most civilized way and to whatever degree possible, thanks to both sides. The trouble (let us not say the drama) was, and still is, the fact that the sincerity, its transparency, the numerical evidence and values, and the arguments linked to the relationship between production and salaries and to the impossibility of avoiding this relationship, arguments that have been made under conditions of general suspicion that undermine us all (in truth, some more than others and there are still a sufficient number who are not sorry enough to forgive), are still interpreted with nonchalance and bitterness in accordance with the principle of "we know what we know."

Looking more closely at the entire union "plot," several aspects have been left underappreciated, which deserve to have our full attention. The tenacity displayed during negotiations took on its own characteristics, and the essential point here is that we are not merely talking about an exercise of ambition, but rather about legal and economic support and about a certain capability, about which now there are countless pieces of "clear" evidence. In the wake of this, the start of the strike actions was correct, gradually thought out and prepared. The psychological pressures that were brought to bear without excesses and violence, followed by a calculated transition to the so-called playing out of the strike in successive stages, with a hint of harassment, are not simple coincidences or happenstance. Throughout the negotiations, it was fundamentally an agreement on certain essential reform issues (rejection of compensation, for example). The dispute, however, focused on the mechanism for eliminating subsidy supports, but, nonetheless, the key problem (and we need to recognize it) of production and productivity and how to increase them was interpreted sufficiently easily by the unions. And, this was done not through ignorance, but rather, clearly, through strategic calculations. And, regardless of how it is viewed, they have to be given the appropriate credit for this. Certainly, obtaining certain salary levels which correspond as closely as possible to providing at least a decent standard of living (and for all categories of salaried workers, as well as those unemployed or retired) is itself the reason for the unions' struggle. And, these, however, are influenced by certain circumstances and a certain economic context which, right now, is not very favorable to us.

There is an additional fact that life itself has demonstrated. When the legal issues (especially in the courts) are closely followed, many of the decisions of great importance made by the unions are, nonetheless, taken over and imposed by their leaders. The radicalization of their positions is not always in accordance with the union members as a whole, who are not always sufficiently clearly and reasonably focused into broad actions, dealing with, in this regard, only the tip of the social iceberg.

Precisely for that reason, we cannot but embrace the idea that a general strike now would be drastically diminished if somehow it did not exclude—it would be hard to calculate for how long—the necessary resources. Even the current resources are proving to be insufficient to meet salary and indexing levels, as well as the much-discussed, disputed,

indicted, and criticized permissible fund, which nonetheless is pegged at 70,000 lei. In this regard, essential corrections have been made. Fluctuations in certain categories of salaried workers have also been taken into consideration. The new protocol also made other corrections which recognize the fact that "very large steps have been taken," between the two sides, according to the assessment of one union leader. It also pegged the limit of the minimum guaranteed salary at 30,000 lei.

Let us recognize that there are ways, at least, of getting out of the crisis. It is also a victory for reason and a sense of balance which manifested itself at the crucial moment on the part of our great majority. If there will be, for both sides, the energy in the end to renounce their pride, the political connotations, and the desire for one side or the other to raise its hands in victory, then there will be a single winner. In fact, economic and social reform will be the winner and, implicit in this, the salaried worker who toils and sacrifices to bring these reforms to life. The moment of truth cannot be avoided. Let us admit that even the best of intentions sometimes do not seem completely formulated without the critical reactions of social partners. This is precisely the role assumed by the unions. A position not exactly easy, an ungrateful one, one marked by great dangers and subjected to all kinds of pressures, including political ones.

What is important, however, is which one will predominate: the desire for morality, balance, and understanding, or feelings of suspicion and revenge.

Businessman Rejects Allegations of Corruption

93BA1023A Bucharest *LIBERTATEA* in Romanian
23-24 Apr 93 p 2

[Interview with Ladislau Frumosu, chairman of the Conef Holding Company, S.A., by Roxana Costache; place and date not given: "Who Wants To Destroy the Nonferrous Metal Industry?"]

[Text] [Costache] Mr. Frumosu, I have known you for a long time—to be exact, since you were "knocking yourself out" with Neferal's concerns, principally as a metallurgist and, no less importantly, in your capacity as the coordinator of the company just mentioned. Also since then, I have been acquainted with your modern organizational concept of "flux," of the motivations for correlating the actions of supply-production-sale in an industrial field as complicated as the nonferrous metal industry. I know too that you were afraid that you would never see the happy day when you could put this concept into practice. But despite it all, here you are at the top of a strategic company in the field.... So please tell me, first of all, is the Holding Company what you consider, then, a "flux" which is absolutely necessary for the Romanian metallurgical industry to break the deadlock it is in? And please explain why we should not mistake the workings of a holding company for those of state interventionism.

[Frumosu] The principal aim of a holding company is the maximization of the profits of each of its component companies and, at the same time, of the whole—in other

words, of the entire concern—capitalizing on the organic connection between them, Conef, through the fifteen associated trading companies. This ensures the production of some goods specific to the nonferrous metal industry:

- Research and design of new production technologies and documentation, and opportunity and feasibility studies.
- The work of importing and exporting raw materials, equipment, technologies, fuels, energy, spare parts, and documentation.
- Financial and banking operations.
- The work of consulting and service in the fields of engineering, trade, marketing, law, information, and personnel.
- The work of middlemen, barter, and commissions.
- Leasing, rentals, and concessions.
- Sales.

Now, if you look carefully at the "profiles" of these companies, you realize the compulsory nature of their work—whether or not they exist specifically within the framework of a holding company. Product competitiveness depends, at the same time, on the growth of output and the widening of the parameters of efficiency in production; it follows that no one can disregard the research and development stage.... This same competitiveness is vitally influenced by manufacturing costs, which explains the interest in having a loyal partner available who will ensure that you acquire raw materials under the most favorable conditions. But because acquisition on reasonable terms means that you must make prompt payments, the role of the financial and banking companies comes "into play," etc., etc. If, for instance, I do not have my own holding company but urgently need money so that I will not have to pass up a favorable deal, an "outside" bank will try to take advantage of the situation (we are in a market economy) and will charge me a higher commission! But if I do have this strategic company, the obstacle falls away! Our common interest, closing the deal and winding it up quickly, will make the bank an ally, not a profiteer.

But I will return to the question which perplexes you: Does the forming of a holding company perpetuate the danger of state interventionism? The holding company does not have the prerogatives of the old state-run industrial concerns! This point is not understood, or maybe some people deliberately pretend that they do not understand it....

From everything I mentioned earlier, it clearly follows that the organizational structure as well as the functions performed by Conef are subordinated, if you wish, to the common aim of maximizing profits. Whoever formulates and applies the strategy over a short, medium, or longer period of time is also subject to the same basic rules! Furthermore, what we are now doing corresponds fully to what is being done (and is being held up to us as an example) by similarly structured companies carrying out their activities in the most highly developed Western countries! The fact that some people do not understand exactly why, on the basis of the resultant strategy, particular funds

can be directed on a priority basis toward a particular company, and the fact that these people call this "intervention" or "socialist interventionism"—well, that is another story. This is just one facet of our inertia which, if I have assumed the responsibility of being the coordinator, should not undermine my determination. Nothing gives me the right to make concessions—neither the pressure from some people nor the slander of others.

[Costache] I will not shy away from acknowledging that "I pushed you" into having to prove your point for tactical reasons, because I have read some articles about "the aluminum mafia." I saw a cartoon depicting "the communist-Securitate octopus" with Metanef written across its head. And I also found a surprising headline: "Larcon, shelter in the storm for mafiosi." As a matter of fact, I wanted to satisfy myself whether, and to what degree, the role of Conef, of which you are the chairman, is identical to that of a state-run industrial concern. And I also want to know if this holding company "is on its last legs," as some well-wishers say, and, especially, to what extent the company constitutes "foul-weather employment for mafia men."

[Frumosu] Before discussing anything else, I think I need to specify some things "on principle." Mr. Petre Mihai Bacanu himself, under whose byline the series in ROMANIA LIBERA which you alluded to appeared, has written in black and white that aluminum is "the most sought-after metal in the world." That piece of information could not be more correct, and I will complete the picture. Aluminum is also traded on the metal exchange. In the past, precisely because of this attribute, Ceausescu paid 60 percent of the country's foreign debt with aluminum. Now, after the events in the eastern part of Europe, some significant stocks of aluminum appeared on the Rotterdam Exchange. The Russians made their deliveries at dumping prices, wiping out for the most part the competition of well-established companies. We found a way to hold out on our barricade, because we knew that nonferrous metals retain their importance, no matter what the circumstances, and that, if we are patient, we can "cut a fine figure" at a particular moment. Metanef, the company which ensures, within the holding company's framework, the sale of our products and brings in bauxite, fuel oil, and electric energy on a quid pro quo basis, played and continues to play an important role in this matter. If, metaphorically speaking, we cut off the head of the "octopus"; if, in other words, we succeed in discrediting Metanef domestically and abroad, it becomes evident that a significant shake-up affecting the extent of "commercialization" will result.... As I was explaining at the beginning, no matter how they are organized, the functions of various divisions, including the sales division, still stand! So we "cancel" Metanef? Well then, someone else will automatically have to take over its job! Who? I don't know. I think, however, that Mr. Bacanu knows.

The fact that things are this way and not some other way results from Mr. Bacanu's next "move," in other words from the "unmasking" of Larcon, the store which made a profit, through sales, for Laromet's products. So, "check!"

is what he says even to a sales division! Finally, the strangest and most treacherous fact of all: On Holy Easter, at the Orthodox Church of Paris, ROMANIA LIBERA sold a "special Easter edition," and what do you think it was "hawking"? Mr. Petre Mihai Bacanu's articles against Metanef and Larcon under inflammatory sidebars, headlines, and subheads such as "The Aluminum Mafia," "Frumosu's Store," "The Octopus Lays Down Its Own 'Law'," "The Government's 'Clean Hands'," "War of Corruption!," plus...the cartoon under discussion.

So then I ask myself: On whose behalf is P.M. Bacanu carrying out this fierce campaign of denigration? What is his purpose in trying to discredit some capable people and, especially, the holding company? We are not so naive that we have not caught on to what he is up to.

[Costache] The "octopus" series brings names and underhanded dealings into the forefront and makes some correlations. Is everything written there "poisonous material"?

[Frumosu] The Arlo Slatina scandal is authentic. Investigations showed irregularities and determined who the guilty parties were. Penalties were imposed, including the dismissal of the incriminated persons and the setting up of criminal files. But precisely because we do NOT operate as a state-run concern, precisely because our companies keep their autonomy intact within the framework of the holding company and are not subordinated to it, neither Conef nor its leadership can meddle in their affairs. As a matter of fact, we have no way of becoming involved.

The fact that the ingredients got jumbled together has a logical explanation, if we bring Mr. Bacanu's incisive measure into the equation. The extrapolation of some local irregularities onto the whole concern was the only way of creating a link, credible on the surface, with "serious transgressions and mafioso actions." It was, if I may put it this way, the only basis for the concoction of the "octopus."

From this point on, facts were thrown around by the bushel basket in the articles, without even the barest minimum of reticence or professional ethics.

[Costache] Can you give us your argument?

[Frumosu] What, in view of the flimsiness of the scaffolding? I will not get started on the articles's "structure." The style of the entire edifice screams for your attention—shocking assertions followed by enumerations of persons or numbers, and, in the course of proving the assertions, a creature persecuted by villains! No. Instead, I will set beside these assertions the reality of the famous "Larcon—shelter in the storm for mafiosi":

—Larcon SRL is not my store; I am a founding member and not a shareholder. I am not the holder of twenty shares, as the article said. And I fail to see how someone can own a store when that person, as the owner, does not control even a part of the store's capital.

—Why am I the person who initiated the creation of Larcon SRL, and why do I back the "race" of Larcon SA? Because the sale of products plays an important role in "finalizing" the productive process, and the company

under discussion sells what the holding company's component companies manufacture, at both the wholesale and the retail level, including to the population at large. Isn't this how things are done in a market economy? In other words, aren't we supposed to obtain the largest possible profit out of the capital invested? Is Mr. Bacanu (who has suddenly become the advocate for Laromet's "family of workers") the enemy of the workings of a market economy?

—If people want to call it "Frumosu's store," I am pleased; this "verdict" really does me honor. It means that, at the same time as I have created some funds which otherwise would have had to have been "squeezed" out of the budget, I have also achieved a social good, selling merchandise demanded by the public, including the Laromet workers, at prices within their reach.

—If Mr. Bacanu is not familiar with the elementary rules of economics and finance, there is nothing we can do; we cannot disregard them.

—Therefore, when a company no longer enjoys the capital necessary to complete its investments (everyone knows that prices have risen), it must resort to a public offer of shares. This is what was done, legally and openly, in the Larcon case: A call went out to the employees of Laromet/Conef, including those from the Department of Industrial Metallurgy system who might be interested. The call was published and posted at Laromet where all the employees could see it, and **no limits were put on who could buy shares**. Some people, after they had signed up, withdrew; their place is being held for them to this day! So how can the article claim that "it would have been fair if most of the shares went to the Laromet workers, whose work enabled the establishment of the store at Bucuresti Noi 166"—here, at last, a hard fact: the address of the store—"but those workers found out too late. It is disturbing that the workers were told that the shares had already run out, that the employees were shoved aside to make room for Conef's nomenclaturist hyenas.... Among the last employees who were still legally in charge at Larcon, chief accountant Ioana Dumitrescu was thrown out."

[Costache] What is the truth?

[Frumosu] From the ranks of the two founding concerns of Larcon, the employees of Laromet hold 1,706 shares, while the employees of Conef hold only 306 shares. One share is worth 10,000 lei and does not have to be completely paid for until December 30, 1994! Out of all the shareholders from Laromet, 57 percent hold between 10 and 40 shares. Corneliu Siliste, economic director of Conef—in other words, one of Mr. Bacanu's "mafiosi"—holds eleven shares, while the family of "victim" Ioana Dumitrescu (the one whose husband is the union leader at Laromet) holds seventy shares. As far as Mrs. Dumitrescu's innocence is concerned, we would ask that it be more carefully documented, because her transfer happened following repeated transgressions. Among those we should recall are undeclared administrative surpluses, gross alterations in the daily bookkeeping so as to cover up irregularities, etc.

[Costache] What are you personally being charged with?

[Frumosu] Let me quote again: "Right after the revolution, corrupt and discredited directors had the idea of creating a holding company...a superstructure composed of former directors who no longer had any reason for being. Ladislau Frumosu, general director of Neferal..."

It is true, I worked at Neferal for 33 years. I was general director; I was not a nomenclaturist but I was a party member, just as Mr. Bacanu was. I am a specialist in nonferrous metallurgy; I hold ten patents for applied inventions (in the old days, Mr. Bacanu did not fight me on this matter!) published in international professional journals, and I am a UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] expert for the promotion of modern nonferrous technologies in underdeveloped countries. Not only that, but because Romania no longer had any use for me, being as I was a director without any purpose in life, after the revolution I was named undersecretary of state under the auspices of the Ministry of Metallurgy. It is true, I do have a great sin on my conscience (I am telling you this so that Mr. Bacanu will not be the one to reveal it): For 25 years I sat on the CAER [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] Scientific and Technical Board for the processing of nonferrous metals.

Now I am a mafioso, on the head of the octopus in the cartoon, the octopus whose tentacles have grabbed, among others, the "Slatina Group of Argentina" (which does not exist!), General Metals Argentina (a false connection, never finalized, taken at a particular moment only as a possible offer), General Metals Switzerland, the liberal Bivolaru, and Gentrans Turkey (which employs Orzata's daughter—see what high-placed connections we used to consolidate our position?). He did not "nail" "godfather" Stefan Marginean except in the issue sold at the Orthodox church service in Paris for ten real francs.

Oh, I was almost going to forget the gravest sin of Metanef, the import-export company which "keeps in touch" with the Ministry of Foreign Trade!!!

So that the dimensions of that great patriot Petre Mihai Bacanu should be completely outlined, among other things broadcast in this country or in Paris, occupying the place of honor is a challenge addressed personally to Prime Minister Vacaroiu: If he does not deal a heavy blow, however shackled he may be through CSP [expansion unknown] channels, eventually these "mafiosi" will "bite off the prime minister's head."

This settling of accounts and verbal aggressiveness cannot fool experts in the field, but they can unfortunately create some confusion among ordinary readers, who cannot believe that the impudence of ROMANIA LIBERA's author has no limits. Maybe an aluminum mafia does exist, but it is not at Conef. Perhaps we will succeed in bringing it under control due to P.M. Bacanu's future measures!

*** Effect of New Law on Romanian Agriculture**
93BA1024B Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 7
May 93 pp 1, 5

[Article by Gheorghe Bogdan: "Law No. 18 Has Put Agriculture Back 60 Years"]

[Text] The success of the 1993 spring agricultural campaign could be the first sign of the beginning of an economic recovery. But, the timely carrying out of spring agricultural work is encountering serious difficulties which are only being partially resolved in certain counties. Such is the case in Prahova County.

Mr. Vasile Iosub, the new director of the Prahova County General Directorate for Agriculture and Food Supply, tells us that 38,212 hectares of planned land area were plowed and planted with wheat and that the growth rates and densities are good. This means that 1993 will be a good year for the wheat crop and the fall grain crops in general. Corn will be planted, depending on what the farmers choose, over an area of 60,461 hectares, compared to 22,000 hectares in 1989. Although the weather has not been favorable thus far, they have been successful in seeding more than 35 percent of the fields.

Due to the characteristics of the region, (approximately one million residents and a strong industrial base), Prahova County has the smallest area of agricultural land per capita, merely 1,400 square meters. Although special organizational measures were taken, in 1993 it is estimated that the county will only be able to produce enough food to supply its own residents for nine to 10 months at the most.

In many cases, we are told, the experts who worked on, loaded, and maintained the sowing machines brought about the fall and spring campaigns. Of landholders, 43 percent are city dwellers, 37 percent are retired persons from rural areas, barely 8 percent are working farmers, and fewer than .1 percent are Western-style farmers. Thus, the number one problem for the success of agriculture in Prahova County is the organization of work on large farms, but, legislation has provided for the establishment of only 157 associations so far.

"Law No. 18, as it was written, put Romanian agriculture back 60 years, and it is not a law appropriate for the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. It even has a negative impact upon the future of Romania," states engineer Vasile Tudose, director for privatization in the County Agricultural Directorate. The Romanian peasant, in general, is poor and rebellious when it comes to spending money—without which there is no development—which has also led to a damaging "poor, but not indebted" mentality. We need to promote the idea of "rich and not indebted" through governmental programs: credits, training, and a realistic development strategy. These are the only things that appeal to the peasant's great appetite for prosperity and work incentives.

In addition, only 201 million lei has been allocated now for obtaining tractors and agricultural equipment at low interest rates, even though there is a demand for approximately 3 billion lei. In addition, 1.2 billion lei of the

required 7 billion have been allocated for implementing so-called agricultural activities.

The supply of tractors presents problems. There are 1,115 tractors which have a workload of over 180 hectares per tractor, much higher than the standard 40 hectares in the West. A workload of approximately 60 hectares per tractor is not envisioned until almost 1996.

Both the peasants and the experts in this county believe that it is a mistake to produce low-powered tractors since the fields in Romania require higher-powered, strong, and reliable models. Instead of wasting time and money with low-powered models, it would have been better to produce models that are known to give good results.

Agricultural workers are encountering difficulties in obtaining fertilizers and pesticides since these sectors of the chemical industry have been affected by interruptions in the supply of natural gas during the winter and by shortages of certain raw materials. Also, our chemical factories have no distribution system for the counties; there are no rail cars to transport products, production prices are especially high, and railroad transport prices are deemed inflated.

In the future, it will be especially important to create management performance positions in the agricultural or the mechanized equipment associations. Managers are needed to work efficiently within a market economy at the national and European levels. One example in Prahova is engineer Nicolae Voinea, chief of the Ciorani mechanized equipment section, whose large harvests, allow products to be exported, thus providing resources for new investments.

Despite the problems presented by Law No. 18, with a lot of effort a glimmer of hope could still shine for Prahova County's 1993 agricultural year.

*** Questions About Privatization of Medicine Raised**

93BA1067A Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian
17-18 May 93 p 3

[Article by Cristina Balteanu: "Privatized Doctors Are Against Profiteering"]

[Text] Friday was the first time in my life that I heard from some doctors that there is corruption in state health-care facilities and that the heads of some of these institutions, which are funded by the state, had privatized themselves with state equipment and with untaxed payments from patients. They indicated that the heads of medical colleges had opened their own medical boutiques and it was unacceptable that the state should lose a billion lei a year thanks to "subsidies" given to doctors who have been listed as handicapped. I heard all of these charges at a press conference held by the Association of Privatized Doctors and Pharmacists of Romania (AMFPR). Some of these issues we as journalists already knew from press reports and information from interviews at the Ministry of Health. But it is one thing for you to hear this from some high-level bureaucrat, even if he is a doctor, and quite another thing to hear this from doctors many of whom, while they have become private practitioners, still also are in state service

and work side-by-side with those whom they are now incriminating. The public is accustomed to a different image of the medical care situation that is put forth by the unions: grinding poverty, miserable working conditions, ridiculously low salaries, crisis after crisis, general strikes.... We no longer know whom to believe.

The AMFPR leadership council believes that only through large-scale privatization will we see improvements in the medical care arena. However, this is nothing but an opinion, so far unsubstantiated by any convincing arguments. The experience in privatization that the AMFPR has gained could be useful in improving current regulations. Unfortunately, the intentions of this group go well beyond this stage and reflect a trend of the private associations seizing the initiative. Perhaps this explains an initiative by others, presented as a "diversion," to organize a conference at the end of May concerning the issue of privatization of health care in Romania, with the participation of international institutes but with AMFPR members only having observer status.

We believe that the following questions should not be answered only by the doctors who have privatized but also by political parties, by the government, by Parliament and by the general public:

—Is privatization of health care necessary in our country?

—In what areas?

—How should this be achieved?

This is necessary because health care reform presupposes a national strategy, great financial resources, changes in approach and mentality, and not only in issues regarding the allocation of space, authority, and the relationships between the private and state facilities.

We end these lines with the hope that health care privatization will not escape the control of state authorities represented by the ministry that still bears the title "Health." Unfortunately, the image that the AMFPR succeeded in creating Friday, which was not flattering, was that they already have become a state within a state and are showing the door to Ministry of Health medical employees. Is this all we have to show for three years of dialogue?

*** Mushrooming Education System Poses Problems**

93BA1067B Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 20 May 93 p 3

[Article by Gabriela Boceanu: "The Bill on Higher Education Is Due"]

[Text] The time is approaching when the bill for Romanian higher education must be paid. For three years, the institutions that appeared in postrevolutionary Romania, whether they were private or state owned, frolicked in the unbounded freedom of higher learning. They developed and multiplied without any restraints, to the "benefit" of Romanian youth hungry for books and especially hungry for a degree. The myth of the diploma that "makes you a somebody," at present has many victims. This has been

accompanied by the mindless application of norms for "the civilized world": so many hundred students per thousand inhabitants. This diploma psychosis has left in its wake a focal point for social tension: an imbalance between the number of college graduates and the capacity of the national economy to absorb them and pay them properly for the services rendered.

In this climate, when state structures were timid in the face of aggressive innovators in education, "universities," "institutes," "academies," and "colleges," both state and private, appeared overnight, like mushrooms, with a bewildering range in the quality of their offerings. It is impossible to believe that those behind these institutions did not know from the outset that this could never last, and that sooner or later, the bill would come due. Aware, too, were the "beneficiaries" of the services offered for a fat fee, when the newborn "market economy" was implemented in the "marketplace" of higher learning. There were enough warnings, but no one could infringe on any of the rights of man, including the right to cheat himself. Certainly those who deceived themselves will declare themselves deceived—by the state, by the government, by the Ministry of Education, and, why not, by the president—because each of these in turn "permitted it," or "did not stop it in time," or "did not see it coming." But they did see it coming. And they had to allow it and they could not stop it. Democracy does not absolve one from the responsibility of one's own choices and actions.

Now the major defrauders have begun to implicate the state for what it did and what it did not do. They say that it is just as guilty because through the Ministry of Education, the state approved all of the requests to establish this mushroom bed of institutes; what would the situation have been had it not approved these requests en masse? It is guilty because it introduced a draft law that strikes out at the great but fragile national effort to privatize higher education; that there is murderous intent behind the minimum standard criteria in this draft legislation, requiring that institutions desirous of accreditation have 60 percent of their staff actually teaching and to own 70 percent of the spaces where instruction is provided. How can you demand of these institutions in their infancy a vigor lacking even in state schools with deep-rooted sources of funds and property? In other words, how can you demand a qualified material base and staff after only two or three years in existence at a time when there is (still) no construction and when the size of the teaching cadre within our country is smaller than that needed to meet the needs of state schools? These rhetorical questions beg for a response with another rhetorical question: If it is too early to demand that your institution meet quality standards, is it not too early for your institution even to be in operation?

Last, but not least, as always, there is the suspicion of corruption. The supporters of privatizing higher education are very concerned that "accreditation will be for sale!" They fear that despite their personal wishes, they will be drawn into the business morass when they want to remain clean and pure in their business dealings, in other words

without any compromising attachments. Given this situation and the longstanding "nonprofit" character of education, a ridiculous situation has emerged. That era, when people spoke of "nonprofit" in the private school arena, that is, of an altruistic system, is over and done with. However, oversight in the market economy presupposes considerable flexibility. Thus you must view the private school as a business: honest, but keep your eyes open. Then, entering into the equation, is the inherent right of the state to verify the honesty of the businessman—namely, the quality of his product—and to protect the consumer. This is in addition to the fact that in any case, the "nonprofit" statute means, very specifically, that the income from fees must be used to pay the salaries of the personnel and provide for the expenses of the physical plant, and, if there is anything left over, it is to be invested to ensure current functionality and new equipment and to expand capacity (I am reading from the draft law for establishing procedures to evaluate and accredit institutes of higher learning and to recognize their diplomas on a national level). The profits are not to be used to line the pockets of the respective school's founders.

Ultimately, respecting these criteria, future institutions of higher learning will, in time, no longer have to fear the prospect of their evaluation and accreditation being based solely on having their first three graduating classes successfully obtain licenses in their area of expertise following traditional procedures. Instead, gradually, their diplomas will be recognized throughout the country and this primary source of social tension will disappear.

And then, what other problems? The real ones, of course, because, after all, the fear of this bill coming due at a time when all accounts are not in order could bring to light other problems. And whatever form the draft legislation would take to control the situation in this arena and whatever provisions it might have, none of it would ever be considered even acceptable.

*** Minister Opposed to Hungarian-Language University**

93BA1021B Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian
11-12 May 93 p 4

[Interview with Minister of Education Liviu Maier by Aurel Ghimpu; place and date not given: "I Am Categorical Opposed to Reestablishing the Bolyai University in Cluj!"]

[Text] [Ghimpu] Shortly after returning from Oradea from an international conference on academic evaluation and accreditation, Minister of Education Liviu Maier answered some questions from our paper: How do you judge the results of the conference?

[Maier] Successful at every level. There were open and relaxed discussions of common problems. For us, the dialogues contributed very much to clarifying some concepts circulating more and more often here: quality, evaluation, accreditation. The fact that representatives of our

parliamentary commissions also participated in the talks allowed us to be better prepared to discuss the legislative plan.

[Ghimpu] Where does our plan stand compared to the ones from the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe?

[Maier] Our approach to these two basic characteristics of the quality of university training was received positively. By way of comparison, I have in mind the experience already gathered by the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, where this process began; but also the failures recorded in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, which used the opinions of foreign experts exclusively in applying the criteria of evaluation and accreditation. For example, this made the Czechs completely reject the "import" of experience and instead take into account their own traditions.

[Ghimpu] Are we alone in the area of expanding private universities?

[Maier] Oh, no. There are 200 in Ukraine and about 150 private universities in the Russian Federation. The expansion of "entrepreneurs" in this area is...remarkable. But in those countries the state controlled from the very beginning the process by means of which these schools were created. In Romania the previous governments did nothing. From this point of view we are facing a different situation compared to them.

[Ghimpu] And I think it is not the only "originality" distinguishing us if we bear in mind that from the viewpoint of budget allocations for education we are in second to last place in Europe.

[Maier] Unfortunately you are right. We cannot get out of that spot in the area of school legislation, either. Measures on school legislation were among the first ones adopted after 1989 in nearly all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We are continuing to lag behind in this area. Our advantage is that we are fine as far as the content of the instructional process is concerned. We have rehabilitated ourselves. The reform program we presented to the participants left a special impression.

[Ghimpu] Should I read into this that the draft law on evaluation and accreditation will see improvements following the Oradea conference?

[Maier] It is not necessary to reevaluate it. The situation of the private universities is not the result of a law but of those within the schools not being involved since 1990. The law, which must be issued urgently, must offer these educational units a legislative act they can relate to.

[Ghimpu] Speaking of legislation, there are less than two months until the state and private colleges graduate their first classes. What will the status of their diplomas be?

[Maier] I would rather not answer. In order for us not to delay the process of recognizing the diplomas of the college graduates I have just one hope: That Parliament urgently discuss the legislative plan we forwarded four months ago.

[Ghimpu] What reference points should be remembered following the conference both by the ministry as well as the university cadres?

[Maior] The joint declaration of the participating countries adopted provides a multitude of reference points. We will make this declaration public. Bypassing an attempt to politicize the document—the Czechs said that as part of the Visegrad triangle they could not sign the document, an assertion I strongly opposed, stating that education cannot have political nuances—the following were decided among other things: better collaboration and a permanent exchange of information; specific involvement of European organs to a greater extent in our reform process. CEPES [European Center for Higher Education], which is a UNESCO organ, will create a commission based on evaluation and accreditation with the participation of all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which will seek standards of quality that are to be imposed by recognizing diplomas at the European level. We all agreed that we must reject the “stamp” of the concept of Europeanization being fussed over in our countries and that we must collaborate more among ourselves.

[Ghimpu] As part of the agenda you also met with the Hungarian minister of education. What were the aspects you discussed?

[Maior] The dialogue with Hungary's minister of education and culture was brought on by the fact that the protocol concluded between our ministries expires this year. Naturally, we have to negotiate a new protocol. After a mutual information session my Hungarian colleague approached the problem of reestablishing the Bolyai University in Cluj. I was categorically opposed to this request, and stated that we are not demonstrating hostility of any kind toward ethnic Hungarian students and that they have equal opportunities with Romanian students for higher education in our country. We agreed that any necessary changes in the draft bilateral agreements should be made by 1 July. This time the agreements are to be signed in Bucharest because previously they were signed in Budapest.

* Police Official Discusses Demilitarization

93BA1021A Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian
11-12 May 93 p 5

[Interview with Major General Ion Marin, chief of the General Police Inspectorate, by Petru Calapodescu; place and date not given: “Demilitarization of the Police: When and How?”]

[Text] [Calapodescu] General, some of the media are talking about the need for the so-called demilitarization of the Romanian police and this is being repeated in a number of publications. How is this idea being viewed in your institution?

[Marin] We are not automatically rejecting this democratic concept, which resounds domestically as well as internationally. However, for many reasons we do believe that this is not the time for it to be put into operation and we also believe that this possibility would be timely only when the

legal state consolidates its structures and when the economy clearly and firmly is on an upward path and is also capable of ensuring conditions to reduce violations of the law. Until then we can make connections in the current structures of the police necessary to have knowledge of and master the new kinds of crime.

It is well known that last year our crime rate was 635 criminal acts per 100,000 inhabitants. This rate is rising this year, too. This phenomenon demands we strengthen the police, not weaken it. Thus, it is necessary to preserve the current military-type operational relations within the institution. Primarily it is a matter of the discipline provided by the system of relationships that now govern the police apparatus. Even Romania's Constitution also sets the place and role of the police among military institutions. Do we really want to change the Constitution, too? I do not know why we stress and keep coming back to this “demilitarization.” On various occasions credence has been given to the idea that the police are predominantly a repressive apparatus. What is this assertion based on? Society asks for laws, Parliament adopts them, the president promulgates them, the Justice Department administers justice, and the police do nothing more than discover and apprehend those who violate the law.

[Calapodescu] And yet, the impression has been created, especially abroad, that you are a military police.

[Marin] Not true! We do not operate as a military unit; rather, we preserve that military kind of discipline that is so necessary for an organization that must confront an explosion of crime caused by many complex reasons. Most certainly, the Romanian police, compared with similar structures in other countries with old and advanced democracies, is able to apprehend more than 80 percent of the offenders. So I ask myself if the emphasis on change at any price should not aim at professional performance. Presently from this viewpoint we are the envy of our western colleagues. We cannot take over just any model you please. I should tell you that the French, seeing our effectiveness, are striving to adopt our system, because they do not find and prosecute more than 25-30 percent of the criminals. Reform of the system must be carried out in order to obtain high-level and efficient performance. A system or a structure cannot be destroyed without replacing it with something else that is well-thought-out and of high quality. Otherwise anarchy will result, with destructive consequences or at best case consequences that are harmful for the other macrosocial systems and structures.

[Calapodescu] As we all know, Romania has a tradition of the police operating according to principles of military discipline.

[Marin] That is how it is. Great politicians such as Alexandru Vaida Voievod and Vasile Lascar insisted on the need for the police to have a military organization as a basic condition for the effectiveness of its work. I would remind you that whereas the Romanian police had been civilian in the interwar period, when the crime rate rose in 1940-41 we moved to a remilitarization of the police. So we can

appreciate that the police are the peacetime army and the army to defend domestic order and state structures.

[Calapodescu] Along another line of thought, could a civilian-type organization of the police be carried out with the current apparatus?

[Marin] No way. We would need three or four times more people, with expenditures which the budget categorically cannot support. If the institution were a civilian one, it also would have to be guided according to the rights of a civilian institution; it would operate on the basis of a collective labor contract. Police services are offered 24 hours a day, including Saturday and Sunday. Who could provide three shifts for civilian police and how could they be provided? Now, nobody keeps count of the number of hours worked because our people are dedicated and also because of the military oath they take. Those who chose this profession are trained to serve the interests of law-abiding people, protecting them from criminals at any risk, without trade union rights, without strikes, without complaints, which is not the case in other professions. Just the other day a police officer was murdered by some lawbreakers and some of his colleagues were hospitalized.

Do we really want destabilization of an institution now, during a transition period when there is enough agitation, an institution which on the strength of the Constitution must defend the order of law and democratic institutions?

Could it be that in this din we are also hearing the "voice" of certain publications which have made it a habit to present police activity in a distorted, tendentious, and ill-willed way and then refuse to publish our right to reply and get at the truth? I repeat, as a military organization we do not have special privileges or advantages, which would be much greater were the police to be a civilian organization. Of course, this will take place in the long run, but only when the evolution of Romanian society will make it possible.

* Continuing High Rate of Infant Mortality Deplored

93BA1108B Bucharest SANATATEA in Romanian Apr 93 pp 4, 10

[Article by Dr. Petru Muresan of the forecasting and health statistics unit of the Ministry of Health: "An Impermissibly High Number of Babies Are Dying!"—under the rubric "Document: The Population's State of Health"]

[Text] During the last three decades, our country has recorded the highest infant mortality rate in Europe. Even though the absolute rate fell by about 25 percent during the 1970's, Romania kept its place in the hierarchy because the other European countries registered similar falls. We should note that in the 1980's worldwide, but especially in Europe, infant mortality dropped markedly, by up to 40 percent, while in Romania the rate fell by about 5 percent. This contributed to our clinching our unenviable first-place position.

At the district level, in the decade of the 1980's, set against an insignificant reduction in the infant mortality rate for the whole country, there were 22 districts in which an actual increase in this indicator was noted (in Caras-Severin, Ialomita, Maramures, Galati, Buzau, etc.)—the only such example in Europe—with increases surpassing even 25 percent. However, there were some districts with considerable decreases in infant mortality (Harghita, Satu Mare, Braila, Gorj, Alba, Vilcea, etc.). Infant mortality rates nationwide for the first eleven months of 1992 are given in the table below.

**Infant Mortality in Romania
During First 11 Months of 1992
(by County)**

Per 1,000 Live Births	
Constanta	36.3
Ialomita	35.0
Botosani	33.8
Iasi	29.9
Calarasi	28.3
Vaslui	28.3
Bacau	27.4
Teleorman	27.1
Galati	26.1
Bihor	26.0
Braila	25.9
Neamt	25.9
Tulcea	25.5
Hunedoara	25.1
Caras-Severin	24.1
Prahova	23.5
Vrancea	23.3
Satu-Mare	23.0
Timis	23.0
Alba	22.7
Bistrita-Nasaud	22.7
Maramures	22.4
Dimbovita	22.3
Salaj	21.7
Suceava	21.2
Mehedinti	21.1
Arges	20.5
Giurgiu	20.2
Covasna	19.9
Olt	19.7
Dolj	19.5
Vilcea	18.2
Arad	17.6

**Infant Mortality in Romania
During First 11 Months of 1992
(by County) (Continued)**

Per 1,000 Live Births	
Bucharest Municipality	17.6
Sibiu	17.4
Cluj	17.3
Gorj	17.1
Mures	16.7
Buzau	16.1
Harghita	15.7
Brasov	15.6

There are numerous risk factors which explain higher infant mortality. Accordingly, these should be brought to the attention, in the first place, of the mother (her education in health matters), as well as of health workers: prevention; early detection of illnesses; emergency hospitalization, because the majority of illnesses in babies are possible emergencies; etc.

The baby's living conditions (a clean dwelling with heat, the feeding of the child, essential medicines, etc.) are important in the prevention and control of mortality, especially for babies at risk. But we must also take the care received by the expectant mother into account, because almost one fifth (18.8 percent) of pregnancies involve a higher risk (a mother over the age of 35; a history of more than three previous births; anemia; use of alcohol, tobacco, or drugs; etc.).

Aside from serious maternal illnesses, which have repercussions on the fetus and on the baby during the perinatal period, low birth weight also presents an increased risk for newborns. Babies weighing under 2,500 grams at birth bear seven times the risk of babies over 2,500 grams.

Infantile dystrophy is a significant risk factor which contributes to death at under one year of age.

To these risk factors we must also add those of a socioeconomic or cultural nature, etc.

Here is why the level and dynamic of infant mortality express succinctly the factors bearing on quality of life, and the care society as a whole gives to ensuring at least a normal biological process for future generations.

In the absence of some general measures in a number of fields, projections for the year 2000 are not very optimistic. According to all forecasting methods, the level of infant mortality could reach around 15 deaths at an age of under one year, for every 1,000 live births—thus, the 1989-90 level in Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary—as compared to five or six deaths per 1,000 live births in some West European countries. Through greater efforts by the state, by society as a whole, and by the health-care system, we could avoid infant mortality resulting from numerous illnesses (respiratory system, digestive system, infectious diseases, etc.), thus reaching figures which would place us in the ranks of those European countries at the level of 10 deaths per 1,000 live births.

**Decline in European Infant Mortality Rates
by Country, 1970-90**

Country	Infant Mortality per 1,000 Live Births			Percent Decline		
	1970	1980	1990	1980/ 1970	1990/ 1980	1990/ 1970
Romania	38.1	28.6	26.9	24.9	5.9	29.4
Austria	23.8	14.3	7.8	39.9	34.7	67.2
Bulgaria	26.2	20.2	14.8	22.9	23.8	43.5
France	12.6	10.0	7.5	20.6	22.7	40.5
Greece	24.1	17.9	9.8	25.7	39.9	59.3
The Netherlands	11.5	8.3	6.8	27.8	18.1	40.9
Poland	25.8	20.6	16.0	20.2	22.3	38.0
England, Wales	16.9	11.1	7.9	34.3	24.3	53.2
Hungary	33.8	20.8	14.8	38.5	24.5	56.2

Federal

Speculation About Panic's Successor

93BA1106D Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 24
May 93 pp 14-16

[Article by Milos Vasic: "Let Us Cleanse Ourselves"]

[Text] Slightly more than a year ago, although it seems to us that centuries have passed, when General Zivota Panic became acting chief of the General Staff of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], and thereby also the future heir to the acting defense minister, Gen. Blagoje Adzic, thus an acting official to the second degree, the stars were bad (the reference is not to the red stars). That is, at the beginning of April 1992 Gen. Panic issued a famous statement from what at the time was still his single status of acting chief of the General Staff to the effect that the JNA would remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina "another five to seven years at least." He had been told to say that, because the semi-Presidency of the deceased state had to pacify the Serbs in Croatia, who had been promised that the JNA would watch over them immediately behind the Bosnian border, at Strmica above Knin. Nor should the possibility be precluded that Gen. Panic sincerely believed that; everyone believed it except Gen. Ratko Mladic, who, as usual, was better informed than anyone else. The JNA could have remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it did not wish to; had it remained, there would have been no war, and the Milosevic-Tudjman (Karadzic-Boban, take your pick) agreement about a fraternal division of Bosnia would have fallen through.

The political context in which Gen. Zivota Panic figures at the head of the JNA is also slippery: The purge of generals is continuing, scapegoat is the specialty most in demand in the army, the list of candidates is lengthy, and a young major was telling VREME at the time that "this time the fish would be cleaned starting from the head." The mood is young Turkish, the approach that of the Black Hand, although the material was not well digested: Apis' shoes proved out to be too big to fill.... Gen. and Dr. Vuk Obradovic, everyone's candidate for the new defense minister and leader of the dynasty of the same name, was blown away because he overplayed his hand (ambition and advertising) and disappeared without a trace. The person whom Dobrica Cosic had elevated above Nikola Pasic saw even this to the end. Gen. Zivota Panic was the ideal choice for surmounting the crisis; a likable bon vivant liked by his subordinates, the soldier's mama, the shrewd Moravian (legend has it that on one occasion he "padded" the number of soldiers punished in his unit in Pancevo so that he would get some award), and officer with combat experience (of some sort—from the Vukovar operation, unfortunately, as we shall see...). In short, the ideal figure for the transitional period.

Political Experiences

The experiences of Gen. Panic's predecessor were instructive. Gen. Kadijevic, automatically suspected by the extreme nationalists (child of a mixed marriage, from Imok, a Yugoslav by conviction), there had been a time

when Milosevic's demonstrators were shouting "Ustasha!" at him in front of the building of the SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense]. Gen. Blagoje Adzic, the favorite of the Serbian nationalists ("The Name of Blagoje Adzic Is Very Dear to Me"; folk song) was to see the day when he would be driven out and none of his worshipers even turned their heads. The message was clear: Do what Pasic says, otherwise a trial in Salonika. The principal advantage of Gen. Zivota Panic's new position was the shock of the JNA's withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the so-called transformation of the JNA into the VJ [Army of Yugoslavia], which in the end turned out to be just like the transsubstantiation of the League of Communists of Serbia into the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS].

Gen. Panic is a tank man, that is, an officer who understands complexity and interdependence more than one would expect from a military man in active service. The sanctions would soon come on 31 May 1992 and it had to be clear to Gen. Panic that the Army of Yugoslavia was dead in the long run under those conditions. It was, nevertheless, a modern army with up-to-date equipment, with relatively modern weapons systems, dependent upon imported components (for example, the Rolls-Royce Viper jet engine used by all the domestically produced aircraft cannot be purchased in Budapest supermarkets). Not to mention the interdependence with segments of the defense industry which remained in the former Yugoslav republics. The emergence of Milan Panic, bearing the same last name, and the aggravation of relations between Milosevic and Cosic, the second thoughts and grumblings of the Montenegrins, the upcoming extraordinary elections, and the ever greater trouble with Bosnia led Gen. Panic into understandable temptations. He understood Milosevic's strategy with the JNA: To pull it by the nose onto thin ice, to outsmart it until the armed forces were brought down to the level of political powerlessness and eliminated as potential competition in the "future state," as Gen. Kadijevic liked to call it.

Gen. Panic saw his chance in Milosevic's troubles. He began to get close to Milan Panic and to Dobrica, the president and commander in chief. What is more, he was talking privately to Vuk Draskovic, to the horror of universal heaven-sent Serbism. The elections were an occasion for getting rid of an inconvenient ally, and Gen. Panic took a neutral-loyal position, taking advantage of every occasion to swear loyalty to Dobrica Cosic, who, nevertheless, even if it be only formally, was the commander in chief. Certain other generals did the same: Gen. Vladimir Stojanovic, commander of the Belgrade Army, for example (Dr. Seselj's attack on him last Thursday should be examined in that light). The president, however, whose anxiety went deeper than his hope, could not resist the call of his first love: Withholding support from Milan Panic, breaking up the unity of the opposition, he pulled the rug out from under his chief of the General Staff. The fate of Zivota Panic was sealed even before the election in December 1992, on grounds of "vacillation and unreliability." He was aware of the danger: At a cocktail party for newsmen in late December, after the election, he warned the journalists present in a strikingly aggressive way not "to write about

how we are helping our Serbian brothers in Bosnia and Herzegovina," although no one had asked him any question about that. The message was clear: I am not a "traitor to Serbism," as some people are already calling me. The outcome of the election also marked a new phase in the political statements of Gen. Panic, a phase in which he is reborn into hard-line Serbism. More and more frequently he speaks the "heaven-sent" language, although he is careful not to promise aid of the Army of Yugoslavia in case of military intervention by the great powers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Gen. Panic's last interview (given on 12 May to the newspaper of the fraternal former Red Army, KRA-SNAYA ZVEZDA) shows signs of inconsistent thinking: "The Bosnian Serbs," Gen. Panic said, "have not backed off from the Vance-Owen plan, from the peace process; on the contrary, they are still in favor of carrying it out." Then the general begins to tell Russia what its interests are: "We feel that up to now the role of Russia in restoring peace in the Balkans has not been in line with its objective geopolitical and geostrategic interests.... The reasons for that are understandable, but unacceptable." Then he dealt with the "historical proximity and age-old alliance with mother Russia, as we lovingly refer to your country...." "We feel that Yugoslavia is Russia's first line of defense...." All of that was in vain: The verdict had been written up, and the executor had been designated.

The Execution

Once again, the new Pasic displayed an awesome feel for humiliating his victims (just look at the fate of Radoman Bozovic when he appears on TV). It was with an infallible sense that Dr. Vojislav Seselj was chosen. The moral purity which he defends can be compared only to a parliamentary democracy in which Mr. Raznatovic can be a people's deputy; both are only a mockery and caricature. Gen. Panic, of course, committed an unforgivable mistake when he first let his son do business with the army and later dictated to him statements to make to the public (as we have been told by certain sources). Dr. Seselj's devotion to principle, however, leaves room for various questions: Why does he not apply the same yardstick to everyone, for example; what should be done about the affairs of the younger Panic was known long ago, and the affairs of certain other generals close to Dr. Seselj were known about as well. The criminal charge against Gen. Boskovic, for example, alleges what has been known from the outset: A number of blots concerning the OPERA affair and the disappearance of a sizable amount of money and a certain quantity of weapons; three apartments, three salaries, and three pensions at the same time for several months; divulgence of military and official secrets, what is more out of personal interest, and so on. Such a well-informed person as Dr. Seselj must also have known about the affairs of Gen. Domazetovic, for example, which make the affairs of the Panic family seem almost innocent by comparison. But Gen. Domazetovic did what Dr. Seselj is reproaching Gen. Panic for not doing: He ethnically cleansed the Army of Yugoslavia so assiduously that Gen. Panic had to intervene and rescind his orders.

Expectation

It was evident that Gen. Panic was politically dead from the correction that the Information Department of the VJ General Staff sent to those who, like our paper, omitted to notice an important difference: The General Staff, not its Information Department, issued the press release in which Dr. Seselj is accused of losing his mind when he lost Gen. Boskovic. That message is also clear: Do not confuse us with them. Thus, for the first time in the history of the JNA/VJ a specialized staff department has publicly disavowed its superior command; but, as the Americans say, there always has to be a first time.... The chief of the General Staff, then, departed and he can seek satisfaction only through a regular court with a slander suit against Dr. Seselj. There have been so many such suits that the competent court decided to merge them all into a single set of proceedings, which Gen. Zivota Panic joined last week. Dr. Seselj was not frightened by that (he enjoys immunity), although a man never knows when the rug will be pulled out from under his feet, as the Herzegovinians say.

Now comes the waiting for a successor. With his attacks on Gen. Vlado Stojanovic, Dr. Seselj is attempting to narrow the choice of candidates. Gen. Stojanovic is openly nominating himself; he has prepared, they say, an entire new team and crew, although they do not say whether Gen. Boskovic would be on board. The amount of time that passed from the appointment of the State Commission to the result is rather illustrative: The opposing forces are in balance. Colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, chief of the Information Department of the VJ General Staff, last week openly accused the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] of the ambition of taking over control of the armed forces. The conditions for something of the kind, to tell the truth, do exist: The bureaucratic-careerist segment of the officer corps will accept Dr. Seselj like the voice of the master, because the master, as usual, is maintaining an aloof silence, and every careerist knows that it is always better to exaggerate in loyalty and firmness than in doubt and liberalism.

When a new chief of the General Staff is appointed, it will all be much clearer, both ahead and behind.

Teenagers Avoid Military Service

93BA1098F Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28
May 93 p 9

[Interview with Gen. Miroslav Miletic, head of the Medical Administration of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, by Bojana Popovic and Borislav Solesa; place date not given: "Teenagers Reluctant To Enter Military"]

[Text] *Of each annual recruiting contingent, 10 percent of the boys do not fulfill their military service obligation, and of that percentage 60 to 70 percent do not do so because of emotional and social immaturity. Of returnees from the armed forces, 70 percent have not fit in with military life, also because of emotional immaturity.*

This very figure, advanced several days ago during a meeting between representatives of the medical administration of the General Staff of the VJ [Armed Forces of Yugoslavia] and VMA [Military Medical Academy] and FRY President Dobrica Cosic, motivated the FRY president to propose renewing the request by the medical administration to require military service after the completion of college. The renewed proposal will come before the Defense Council shortly.

The head of the Medical Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, Brig. Gen. Dr. Miroslav Miletic, spoke with BORBA about the law on military service adopted in 1970, according to which young men serve at age 18 and 19, about rejected requests based on the needs of the armed forces and on professional medical research, and about the experiences of two generations of 18-year-olds in war.

[Miletic] In the 1980's, the question was raised—in the Assembly, as well—of why some young men have the perk of serving their time in the military after completing college and some do so beforehand. Then, in 1980, a purely political decision was made that everyone should serve at age 18 and 19, while medical examinations for the armed forces should be conducted at age 17 and 18. Even then we were staunchly opposed to this, and we wrote up requests that this decision be changed. The medical collective in the military realized that a uniform military collective cannot be made out of 18-year-olds. Even in nature, in a flock or a herd, you have one who leads, the stronger one, one who takes charge, but we had a group of 18-year-olds who were practically on the same level. Back then we assumed, precisely because there were no older ones, that there would be increasing numbers of maladjusted soldiers. Moreover, through this decision the military lost experts who after completing college were indispensable to units as soldiers—on the one hand, they did their job (doctors, pharmacists, for example), while on the other hand they were necessary as components of smaller units. Thus, no one appreciated these two reasons—medical reasons and the needs of the military. I repeat: The decision was political because of some sense of equality among soldiers in the military and because of the aspiration to socialize national defense and social self-defense.

Realization in 1989

Our assumptions quickly proved to be accurate. Since we were dissatisfied with the lack of appreciation for our requests, we organized research projects and a symposium. Here is an example of the sort of conclusions presented to the symposium held in 1989: "Even more significant is the fact that in some parts of our country there is an extremely high level of men rejected for military service due to inadequate mental development and emotional immaturity, and that the inappropriate and adverse effect on the family and society has retarded their process of maturing emotionally and socially."

Our military leaders, war veterans, at the time assured us that they had gone to the bunkers at age 15.... Right, at age 15 they were mature, because up to that age they had been

barefoot, they had escaped for a crust of bread, their mothers did not wake them up at 1000.... These military leaders of ours were right, but we were not right, because 18-year-olds are no longer what they used to be. The other conclusion from the symposium was this: "The vast majority of 19-year-olds are fit and mature for military service, but it is also indicated that the lack of older and more mature soldiers has an adverse effect on the stabilization of the military collectives as well as on the emotional and social maturity of young soldiers." Based on this research and our requests, the decision was changed. The SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense] adopted a decision to exempt individual fields from military service until after the completion of study—medicine, pharmacy, veterinary medicine, dentistry, and some fields of technical machinery and electrical engineering—because of personnel considerations.

[BORBA] Why was there this division of fields of study? Why not all of them at once?

[Miletic] We were looking primarily at the medical aspect, but it was also necessary to look at the needs of the military. We were aware that in the armies of the world with this sort of organization, military service began after the completion of high school. Because you cannot make a young man who has completed high school and is not continuing his education wait (without doing military service he cannot go abroad, he cannot get a job), nor can you allow him to enroll in college and then interrupt his studies because of military service. Actually it was one constraint, the needs of the military and the findings of medical science, that led us to find a standard for this, so that for now at least those fields of study would be exempted. This was appropriate from the medical side as well. We would have plenty of high-school graduates and college graduates in the military ranks, which, as I have already noted, are very essential to the collective. I was a troop doctor for a long time and I have experience with soldiers, so that I know what it means to have capable, college-educated soldiers in which the other soldiers have more confidence than in the officers. This is in fact a specific relationship. Officers say "I understand" even when they do not understand, while the soldier about whom we are talking is trusted. Such things should not be neglected.

Length of Service and the Military

[BORBA] Are there any considerations and proposals for "including" military service in the length of civilian service?

[Miletic] Now that Albanians and Muslims, for example, are not responding to call-ups, it is not fair for someone to lose a year in the military. It would be equitable if it were decided that whoever does not want to serve in the military should not, but that those who do should be rewarded by adding that time to their length of civilian service.

[BORBA] Motivation is a particularly important condition for military service, but these figures apparently indicate that there is in fact less and less motivation.

[Miletic] The influence of the family, school, and society in general have contributed to a decrease in motivation for military service. This idea that "a Serb gladly joins the military" and the belief that someone who has not served is worthless has changed, and there is a certain amount of support for evasion of military service. The experience from these recent wars is interesting, however, indicating that the parents have been much less compliant than their children. For example, I have heard the mother of a young man say, "My son is unfit, it will not work, he cannot hear gunfire," while the son responds, "What's wrong with you, Mom, what are you saying? I'm going to do my job." Naturally, this is one example, but parents have rejected this more often than their children have.

[BORBA] After every war, there are soldiers who are psychologically traumatized, and psychological trauma can be broken down into numerous war syndromes. We are familiar with the Vietnam syndrome and the war neuroses that appeared in our country after the World War II. What do you think about that?

[Miletic] I am an adequately experienced doctor and I have an adequate service record. I must tell you that today there are individuals or many of them who are trying to cash in on everything, even the little bit that was experienced or seen on the battlefield. We have such people even without war, people who even without war get sick, and who are now attributing that to the war. The medical service has a commission for assessing functional capabilities, which is very objective in its appraisals and has no intention whatsoever of harming anyone. In this war, however, we have the phenomenon of overemphasizing the merits of war, which was also the case in the Second World War. In addition, we have one other phenomenon in the armed forces. If a soldier breaks his arm while serving his term of duty, or if he is injured, then he seeks compensation from the military. However, if the same thing happens to him in a bar, then that person has the right to health care; it could be said that somehow we have alienated the military from itself. But it should actually be understood as a job, as a workplace.... If we connect all this, it comes as no surprise that this is all the way it is and that this is one of the reasons that this immaturity, this emotionally and socially incomplete development and lack of motivation comes back to us. When all this is combined, there are often "short circuits" in the unit, and then the problem is solved through medicine. And I think that that is sensible. If someone cannot fit in, cannot adjust, then let him take a break, and perhaps in several years he will be able to serve.

[BORBA] This law that is currently in effect has sent two generations of child-soldiers, 18-year-olds, to war. What is your assessment and how would soldiers behave if, say, older men went into the military, as is currently being proposed?

[Miletic] We also have research on that, since the first shot was fired in Slovenia. Perhaps it will surprise you, but these soldiers matured very quickly and became serious fighters. To answer your question, I would say that in one unit where there was a serious, unswerving officer, those young men were the pride of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army].

However, in units where the soldiers sensed hesitation on the part of the officers, that provoked terrible chaos in the psyches of those young people.

[Box, p 9]

Rural and Urban Boys

Discussing the difference between urban and rural boys as well as Montenegrins in the military, Dr. Miletic explains:

"Stories about the attitude of Montenegrins toward the military are not unfounded. That national belief has truly had an effect on making them mostly excellent soldiers. The attitudes of urban and rural young men toward the military are different. In the country, there is still the belief that a boy who is not for the military is no good for marriage either. As far as cities go, I can say that the bigger the city, the bigger the problems.

"Hence the problem with drafting boys from Belgrade. Yes, there has really been a low response even for the war, but that is not the rule, and one should not draw certain far-reaching conclusions from that. Perhaps I am already in the political domain here, which I want to avoid at all costs. There has been interference in these matters. The war has done this in a very strange way, but it is up to us to study this and understand it."

[Box, p 9]

Medicine Under Sanctions, Too

"It was explained to me that the world sanctions against us do not apply to medicine, but our experience tells us otherwise. For example, we order the most essential medicine from the United States, but they inform us that we must pay for it. We respond that we have already deposited the money in such-and-such bank, but they send a telegram saying that that money is blocked because the country is under blockade, and that we must send cash!?"

"Thus, this is how things look in practice, and I really do not know how long we will hold out. Medicine and AIDS tests are already running short. I do not understand how they cannot see that this is not political and that that disease does not distinguish between states, nations, continents. I would like to see understanding for these matters, but unfortunately we are living in difficult times. There is less and less medicine available. No one can envy me in this position," says Brig. Gen. Dr. Miroslav Miletic.

Macedonia

Stationing of U.S. Troops, Sovereignty, Recognition

93BA1113A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 20 May 93 pp 13-14

[Article by S. Stankovitch: "Delayed Defenders"]

[Text] Macedonia must preserve its sovereignty, regardless of whether NATO forces will come or UNPROFOR [UN

Protection Force] will remain. This is the unanimous conclusion reached at the miniroundtable sponsored by PULS on the occasion of the informal announcement of the arrival of U.S. troops in Macedonia.

Does the direct threat to Macedonia of war increase with an eventual pacification of the Bosnian situation? Does Macedonia, as a sovereign country and member of the United Nations, feel the need to invite on its territory new foreign soldiers to ensure its security? Will, invited by the Macedonian authorities, U.S. troops, in general, be deployed on its territory (as military forces of the United States, or NATO, or as part of the UN forces, and how, in what numbers, and with what kind of mandate?), or else will the United States simply "verbally" spread its influence without firmly stating what its real interests in Macedonia could be? Will the status of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] units in Macedonia be redefined? What will be the eventual reactions of Macedonia's neighbors to such possible activities on Macedonian territory? These are only some of the questions to which, after extensive studies, answers could be sought in Macedonia in the immediate future.

For that reason, in addition to the statements made on this issue, heard abroad only, PULS organized a miniroundtable "on home grounds," attended by retired General Todor Atanasovski, Dr. Vladimir Ortakovski, professor of international law, and UNPROFOR Press and Information Officer for Macedonia, Alan Roberts.

In the course of the almost three-hour long exchange of thoughts, some of the complexities of the problem, caused by the answers to the question of the means of ensuring Macedonian security, became crystallized. They included the constellation of forces in the area and the divergence of interests between Europe (the EEC and the particularly great interest shown by Russia) and the United States. Under those circumstances, the silence that has prevailed so far and the avoidance of direct clarifications to be made to the Macedonian representatives cannot imply a confusion in the matter of the "U.S. challenge." They require an assessment of the thoughts about the decisive step to be taken and the choice of an option which would provide the best possible opportunities in terms of the future. It is clear that in all the talks on the deployment of a foreign military force in Macedonia, the final word belongs to its representatives, and this is true regardless of whether or not U.S. troops are sent to strengthen the UN forces or will arrive in Macedonia as the advance element of the NATO forces. This is a step which will have to be discussed with Macedonia and its agreement must be ensured. Anything else would violate the national standards and the code of noninterference in internal affairs, according to Atanasovski and Ortakovski.

Bearing in mind the fact that the participants of the roundtable concluded that in order to safeguard world peace Macedonia must defend itself, but that because of the size and equipment of its own army and the superior military power of its neighbors it is unable to do so alone, for the time being all the Macedonian leadership has left is informal options which call for informal clarification. One

of them is to ask Europe to redefine the mandate of UNPROFOR forces and to obtain a much greater increase of UNPROFOR's authority, or else to become part of the collective defense system through NATO. Unofficially, UNPROFOR believes that the presence of U.S. forces in Macedonia is not necessary (and that it would create some problems for Macedonia in terms of its neighbors, above all Serbia, after the Americans lose their present interest), and that the UN forces, considering the still stable situation, would be quite sufficient to guarantee Macedonian security. Such was the impression gained from Alan Roberts' statement.

Normally, this would require a new treaty between Macedonia and the United Nations, concluded directly and not involving the command in Zagreb in such a relationship. Most likely, however, taking into consideration the existing situation, the Macedonian government has not as yet responded to the "signals" indicating Europe's interest in avoiding the possibility of replacing UNPROFOR with U.S. forces. Macedonia is part of Europe, and its involvement in contemporary European affairs is a path that could lead to misunderstandings with the European Community and with CSCE (liked by Macedonia's neighbors and some internal groups).

However, experience learned from the activities of the European Community and UNPROFOR do not offer a great deal of hope for the stabilization of the situation in the Balkans. One can easily assume that, on the basis of a strictly agreed-upon period of time, the temporary presence of NATO would be the best preventive answer to the threat stemming from any eventual aggressor. On the other hand, the reservations concerning the strengthened foreign military presence in Macedonia are due precisely to the fact that Macedonia is a state with defined boundaries and population that, in the future as well, should rely on peaceful cooperation with all neighbors. Assuming that the U.S. mission to Macedonia is viewed as a sincere assistance provided by the United States or (should the U.S. forces come as members of NATO) the international community, to the youngest member of the United Nations (with the entire skepticism with which the word sincerity is used in politics), questions will remain regarding any eventual violation and partial loss of sovereignty and a threat to Macedonia, for the deployed U.S. forces would be used for military operations outside Macedonian territory.

The problem facing the Macedonian authorities on meeting the request, so far unofficial, was pointed out at the roundtable. The Americans launched their trial balloon, while the Europeans, despite their current neglect of the Republic of Macedonia, will certainly not easily abandon that area as their own sphere of influence (perhaps with the exception of Russia which, despite the expected disagreement with the U.S. involvement in areas which "historically" have been Russia's, considering the situation in which it finds itself would find it difficult to give substance to its oppositions), Todor Atanasovski believes.

The forthcoming decision is a tremendous burden imposed on the Macedonian leadership and requires urgent decisions.

[Box, p 13]

The United States Could Recognize Macedonia

The current presence of UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia is a specific case. This was the first preventive mission of these forces on the territory of a country that, at that time, was not a member of the United Nations. Now, with the acceptance by the United Nations of the Republic of Macedonia, the situation has changed. In principle, the presence of any foreign forces on the territory of a sovereign state also means a limitation of its sovereignty. However, this must not be interpreted rigidly, for that would mean that any international treaty could be interpreted that way. Actually, by the very fact of being a member of the United Nations, any country, including the Republic of Macedonia, voluntarily surrenders a certain part of its sovereignty. The eventual arrival of U.S. forces would most likely be interpreted as expanding the contingent of international forces. This means that the U.S. forces as well, by Security Council resolution, would act as forces of the United Nations with which Macedonia could sign a new treaty. This could also be viewed as an encouragement for us to ask that UNPROFOR include forces of countries that have already recognized us as a sovereign state. Otherwise, I believe that a way must be found to determine the present temporary status of the UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia and to redefine it on the basis of a new treaty between Macedonia and the United Nations.

Initially, U.S. forces could enter Macedonia also independently of UNPROFOR (as part of NATO or separate from it), should the authorities of our country request the presence of foreign troops. In that case, however, a bilateral agreement would have to be signed between Macedonian and the United States. In itself, normally, such an agreement would entail the recognition of Macedonia by the United States, for an agreement of this kind can be signed only between two equal countries! This is still in the domain of assumptions. However, such an eventual decision made by Clinton would provide us with some trump cards. Considering the increased interest displayed by the United States in Southeastern Europe, we could ask that the United States guarantee our security for as long as the threat of war remains. However, this must be based on a precisely formulated treaty concerning the duration of the stay of U.S. forces on our territory. One of the results has already been achieved, that of drawing the attention of the global community to Macedonia's strategic importance.

[signed] Dr. Vladimir Ortakovski, professor of international law

[Box, p 13]

Macedonia Is Defended by Macedonia

The strategic position of Macedonia results from the war in former Yugoslavia, for which reason, although being a small country, Macedonia is of great importance in preventing the expansion of military operations. We should know that the United States' concept was to establish a cordon sanitaire in Macedonia and Albania and along the Drina, to monitor the situation, and also to fragment,

dehomogenize and, through demarcation lines, break up the strategic unity of Serbia, the originator of aggression. The creation of such zones would make the further expansion of the aggression impossible. This cannot be achieved without the use of Macedonian territory, which plays a role in such a U.S. strategy. All control lines of NATO forces (originating in Greece) go through Macedonia (in terms of an eventual ground action against Serbia). Some 1,500 armored carriers and about 2,000 artillery-rocket units are deployed in Greece, and their communication lines run exclusively through Macedonia. The Albanian lines lead to Herzegovina. One can easily assume that, threatened by military action, Serbia could take countermeasures by extending its defense activities to Macedonian territory....

As long as Macedonia remains defenseless, the spreading of the war cannot be prevented. Macedonia must either defend itself alone, to the best of its capability, which would be the best possible solution, or to defend itself as part of a collective defense system. Therefore, in order to prevent the spreading of the war, it is necessary to defend Macedonian territory and sovereignty. However, Macedonia cannot be defended without Macedonia! This means that all activities related to the eventual arrival of foreign forces must include Macedonia, and that everything else, subsequently, will develop with Macedonian agreement. Not even the big United States could defend Macedonia unless Macedonia itself is in a position to defend its own territory!

As to the possibility of the abatement of the war, no hasty evaluations are necessary. Serbia has its own strategy with its own targets that currently emphasize Bosnia and Herzegovina. If Bosnia-Herzegovina were to "fall", including as a result of an international agreement, Croatia would lose its Knin area. Serbia wants a corridor to Bosnia precisely so that the results of the war would be felt by Croatia. No one should dare underestimate Serbia's possibilities. So far, Serbia has not used its full human and technical potential, and the fact is that on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, currently controlled by the Serbs, reserves are located in an area that had been considered in the past as the strategic defense line of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Strong fortifications have been built in that area in accordance with the geostrategic features of the terrain, and here blocking convoys is of no great help. That is why both U.S. and European reservations concerning an intervention in Bosnia are not far from the truth. This war is quite different from the war in Vietnam, and classical military instruments cannot be effective because of several internal factors. Even NATO's technological supremacy could not yield results, for which reason different solutions are being sought to prevent the spreading of the war.

[signed] Retired General Todor Atanasovski

[Box, p 14]

UNPROFOR Must Remain

I believe that currently, and this is also our impression in UNPROFOR, the situation in Macedonia is stable. However, it is a question of whether the present government has asked for the presence of U.S. forces without our knowledge. To the United States, a military presence is one

possible option. However, whether this option would be accepted by the Macedonian government as well, regardless of or as an alternative to the forces which are already here, we shall have to wait and see. Personally, I believe that the current UNPROFOR forces deployed along the northern and western borders are adequate to fulfill the current Security Council mandate. They look at the situation, report on its development and on anything which could destabilize the Macedonian border. If this changes, everything else would as well. At the present time, we truly do not know, but it is not certain that the Americans have decided to send forces, what their strength would be, where they would be deployed, and what exactly such forces would be doing....

I honestly believe that there is a certain confusion within the U.S. Administration on the issue of the policy toward former Yugoslavia. Considering the threat that the situation could heat up, Clinton must decide what steps to take within one month. There is lack of understanding whether forces must be sent to Macedonia and Kosovo at all costs, or else to Bosnia. The conflict in Bosnia must be stopped. However, in order to achieve this, as Great Britain and France explicitly demand, the expensive participation of U.S. forces is necessary. I believe that it is clear that the Europeans are waiting to see the Americans involved in this entire matter and not only as participants in the Bosnia action. However, the Republican Administration as well had doubts about sending troops to the Gulf although this was to be a victorious war of great interest to the United States. Now, the United States must make its position clear on sending forces to Bosnia, with its caves and areas suitable for stationing forces, something similar to Vietnam. That is why I think that it will be very difficult to meet the European request for U.S. involvement....

The question remains of who is paying for such activities in Bosnia as well as here, in Macedonia. Let us immediately clarify that these are military operations conducted by member countries of the United Nations. It appears that this is something which the present government accepts. I am not sure that this government would truly want a U.S. military presence here. In my view, no single European wants to think about it. Although I have been here a very short time, I feel that there are clear historical ties and very close relations between Macedonia and Serbia. In the United States, Serbia is considered responsible for all the suffering in former Yugoslavia; in my view, that is not the way the UN thinking goes. I believe that the local authorities must take into consideration that the suffering may become a thing of the past, but that the Serbs would remember that it was this government that let this country become some kind of firing ground from which to shoot at their brothers in Bosnia. However, I am not so sure that the United States would decide to send its forces, and I believe that Clinton has said that "we shall place forces in Bosnia but only on the basis of an agreement with the Europeans," and that he expects greater pressure by Europe as justification....

[signed] Alan Roberts, UNPROFOR Press and Information Officer for Macedonia

* Macedonian Youth Threatened by Drugs

93WD0604B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 18 May 93 p 22

[Article by S. Dimevski: "Children in the Claws of Drugs"]

[Text] *Macedonia is becoming an area in which all types of drugs are being "stockpiled" and used in increasingly larger quantities; the drugs most often used are heroin and marijuana, which are sold and consumed in those places that young people frequent—cafes, discotheques, and teahouses.*

Drugs, the greatest evil of this century, can already be said with certainty to be entering our republic through the front door. What we were able to see or read about drugs in the past is currently, with full seriousness, threatening us as well. In a short time Macedonia, instead of a country where drugs and drug addiction were discovered in time and put under appropriate control, has become fertile soil for a trade that has already clearly succeeded in "amassing" and recruiting an entire army of addicts.

Located at the crossroads of all the more significant drug channels, but at the same time representing favorable soil for the production of poppies and marijuana, Macedonia is already a territory where all types of drugs can easily be found. According to some indicators, the most prominent one is heroin, which is transported from Asia through Turkey, as well as domestic "products" like marijuana, which is particularly represented in eastern Macedonia, and raw opium, left in "stock" from the times when poppies were produced here. Among drug addicts, the much more expensive cocaine, as well as hashish, have likewise become current recently.

Cafes

The data presented at an Interior Ministry news conference, from which it can be seen that drug bosses already have Skopje divided up into spheres of influence, showed that this is not just a question of empty talk. Thus, heroin is mostly sold on the left bank, while marijuana is more present on the right bank of the Vardar. As places at which the police have recorded the movements of a large number of dealers and consumers of opiate drugs, they cited the three biggest discotheques in the city, Sileks, Hard-Rock, and MNT, as well as cafes and teahouses in the Old Market quarter—Mondrijan, 21, Salvador, Ak Saraj, and At Al, and at the Mavrovka TC [Commercial Center], the cafes Strk, Foka, Crna Macka [Black Cat], and Hors. According to the police, drugs are also consumed at ZZ Top and Iv, which are located in the Kapistec commercial center, as well as at "chic" meeting places for young people—Kristijan, Van Gogh, and Cinema.

Since drugs, and drug addiction, to which they are closely linked, represent a problem to which serious attention should be devoted, the dilemma of who should be entrusted with the battle against this evil arises. Should it be just the police, who so far have fought by themselves against the "white powder" dealers, or, as in the West, should it be a comprehensively constructed system of institutions, in which each one of them, through an appropriate treatment

and approach, will take care of the prevention and treatment of addicts, while the police, and if necessary also the army, will only go after drug profiteers?

Addicts—The Youngest

As in the past, the police in our country are making an effort to deal with the purchase, distribution, and trafficking in all types of drugs, but as it was emphasized at the news conference, because of the objective circumstances facing Macedonia at the moment, that is not enough, however. It is necessary to have the active inclusion of several other bodies and institutions in the struggle against drugs and drug addiction, above all health care and education.

If one knows that the biggest addicts, according to police indicators, are precisely the youngest people, namely between 16 and 22, then the need to include educational institutions in the struggle against drug addiction becomes inevitable. The inclusion of teachers, sociologists, and psychologists in the education of young people and their families, through individual discussions or even organized forums in which the danger threatening them will be openly discussed, is only a small part of the preventive measures that can be taken in the struggle against this evil.

Likewise, health care, whose task is to take care of alleviating the consequences of drug addiction, i.e., to treat addicts, must construct a new concept for appropriate treatment of them. It must acknowledge that with things set up as they are now, it cannot do much, i.e., help drug addicts.

Drugs represent a supranational phenomenon, which is present in all strata and societies regardless of race, belief, religion, and occupation, as a result of which a suitable state model of prevention has to be found, since otherwise, the above-mentioned figure of several hundred registered drug addicts will increase many times over in a short time, and thus Macedonia will irrevocably lose the relative social peace that it has.

* Macedonian Interior Ministry on Drug Addicts

93WD0604A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 15-16 May 93 p 17

[Article by S. Dimevski: "Discotheques—Places To Smoke Marijuana"]

[Text] At yesterday's news conference at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, alarming data were presented on the increasingly larger number of people dependent upon drugs; 436 drug addicts are registered, but it is assumed that the number of drug users is in the range of around 2,000; heroin, which is purchased in Turkey for 12,000 marks a kilogram, costs 20 to 80 marks a gram here.

Although until now Macedonia has only been a transit station, through which drugs from Asia have been transferred through the so-called Balkan channel to West European states, recently, especially after the outbreak of the war in the former Yugoslavia and the formation of new states in the Balkans, and with the establishment of more

and more border crossings, a large part of the drugs are remaining in the republic, and this has resulted in an increasingly larger number of new registered drug addicts. This was emphasized at yesterday's news conference at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, during which Pavle Trajanov, under secretary at the Ministry, Filip Filipov, chief of the City Internal Affairs Administration in Skopje, and psychiatrist Ivan Tulevski spoke about the new trends in drug addiction, as well as the sociopathological phenomena resulting from it.

Channels Cut Off

Talking about the role of the Interior Ministry in preventing this truly alarming phenomenon, Trajanov emphasized that in the last two years alone in Macedonia, 10 smuggling channels have been cut off, with 38 kilograms of heroin, 22 kilograms of raw opium, and 16 kilograms of marijuana seized. With the increasingly larger presence of drugs in this region, especially among the young population, the number of people dependent upon them is growing correspondingly. Thus, according to the ministry's data, 436 drug addicts are registered in Macedonia, but the ministry is of the opinion that the true number is somewhere around 2,000 drug addicts, 1,500 of whom are in Skopje alone.

The measures that the Interior Ministry is undertaking to curb drug trafficking, although they are yielding some results, are nevertheless not sufficient for completely curbing drug addiction, which, if it is not prevented at the start, can have tragic consequences for young people. Since drug addiction is closely linked to the increase in all forms of criminal behavior and with the occurrence of other sociopathological phenomena, especially prostitution, the police are trying to have other organizations and institutions included in the struggle against this evil, especially the Ministries of Health (with a comprehensive approach to the treatment of drug addicts) and Education (with preventive activity in schools and families).

Astronomical Prices

Talking about the types of drugs sold and consumed here, the places where they are offered, and the price, Chief Filip Filipov emphasized that the most prominent drug among young people was heroin, which was actually also the most tragic one. It is procured through various channels from Turkey, at a price of 12,000 marks per kilogram, and it is sold in Macedonia for two or three times as much. Depending on the quality, the dealers sell heroin at retail for between 40 and 80 marks a gram. Most of it is sold by the drug addicts themselves, and most of them are Albanians (95 percent of the dealers), while marijuana, a drug that is smoked in larger groups, is usually present in discotheques, and a great deal of it is used by Macedonians. As places in which drugs can easily be found and used, the three biggest discotheques in the city were cited, as well as several cafes and teahouses in the Old Market quarter, the Mavrovka Commercial Center, the Kalistec Commercial Center, and on the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] Boulevard.

If we want to prevent the trade in drugs and drug addiction from the outset, and if we want to preserve social peace in the republic, in addition to the police's role it is also necessary to elevate health care to a powerful sector for the timely prevention and treatment of drug addiction, Dr. Tulevski emphasized. In addition to regularly monitoring this evil and informing the public about it, Macedonia also needs to have a model constructed for the prevention of drug addiction, as well as new institutions and establishments for treatment, without the treatment of addicts being reduced, as in the past, solely to psychiatric institutions, Dr. Tulevski emphasized at the end of the conference.

Montenegro

Montenegro Forms Own Literary Society

93BA1098C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 27
May 93 p 7

[Article by D. Vukovic and B. Milicic: "Different Views of Founding of Montenegrin Matica: Rapprochement or New Divisions"]

[Text] *The founding of the Montenegrin Matica [literary society] is in line with those political aspirations in Montenegro where the predominant goal is to strengthen Montenegrin national self-awareness and fully articulate the authentic Montenegrin political, economic, and cultural interest. This involves deviating from Serbian integralism in all these spheres or, to be more precise, opposing that integralism.*

Not counting the steps that were taken in this regard while Montenegro was a socialist republic (the founding of the university and of the Montenegrin Academy of Science and Art), the first step in the new era, marked by the beginning of the disintegration of the SFRY, was the founding of the Independent Association of Writers, and then of the Pen Center; now there is the Montenegrin Matica. Operating on the same wavelength is the Committee for the Restoration of the Autocephaly of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which is supposed to be one of the cornerstones of a separate Montenegrin state and a powerful tool in the definitive reinvigoration of Montenegrin national awareness and the validation of Montenegrins as a political nation that will establish equal relations with the other south Slavic nations, especially with the Serbs.

Now or Never

Something that others did in the Age of Enlightenment the Montenegrins have decided to do at the end of the 20th century, aware as they are of their historic lag and, to a certain extent, angry at themselves because of it. Academician Dr. Pavle Mijovic, the main speaker at the founding meeting of the Montenegrin Matica, addressed this one-century lag, because of which consequences have piled up. He described the 1918 unification with Serbia as a time of "the loss of the soil under our feet," a time after which "the roots and stems with which our motherland and Montenegrin spiritual culture were nourished dried up, and with them humaneness, which means also the completion of

humanism, which was suddenly interrupted with the fall of the Montenegrin state." Academician Mijovic believes that despite the obvious delay, "an occasional ray of light penetrates, which is a sign that although we are late, it is never too late for us to tackle the job that we have abandoned."

"Perhaps it is also not too late," academician Mijovic said in Cetinje, "for us to accept now the founding of the already archaic institution of the Montenegrin Matica, because amends cannot be made for what has been neglected if we do not once again reflect and forge ahead in such a way that we compose a mosaic of our recognizability and national identity."

Sreten Asanovic, a writer and one of the participants in the founding meeting of the Montenegrin Matica in Cetinje, told BORBA that "the Montenegrin nation and all its citizens need the Matica now or never. Today, when unfortunately and shamefully many people want to break up and eradicate, dispossess and rename Montenegrins and their state, their culture and art, holy objects, and monuments, creators and hard workers, their language and different way of writing, their nearly 1,000-year tradition, statehood and culture, the dignity of Montenegro and its present-day and future life," says Asanovic. He believes that the Montenegrin Matica "can and must not only preserve and value what we have, but also modernize and advance it, hasten the creation of the new, for the good and benefit of the Montenegrin nation and of all citizens of Montenegro."

"This is the great and honorable task of the Montenegrin Matica, for the present and for the future, this is the condition for the advancement of the culture and art of Montenegrins and of all the nations that comprise Montenegro," Asanovic said.

An essentially different view of the founding of the Montenegrin Matica is held by Dr. Novak Kilibarda, a professor of literature at the Department of Philosophy in Niksic and the leader of the most influential Serb party in Montenegro.

Nothing Good

"An institution formed by former prominent actors from the communist-Titoist regime is nothing good. The matica of a nation as a cultural institution is very important, and I would have nothing against a Montenegrin Matica that was the result of the most creative forces living in Montenegro and that would signify the advancement of the culture of Montenegro. However, a matica whose secretary is Mr. Marko Spadijer, who is known as the most heinous Zhdanov from the communist era, cannot be anything other than a tool for a very dangerous political ideology, a dangerous political manifestation."

Dr. Kilibarda believes that the newly founded Matica does not promote the cultural rapprochement of the nations and faiths of Montenegro, but rather promotes divisions in them.

"Their definition is very strange. As they say, the Matica will bring together people who regard Montenegro as their homeland. Are those of us who were not invited to that

meeting people who do not regard Montenegro as our homeland? Never in the history of any European nation has any matica been founded that was not established by the greatest creative minds in the fields of art, science, and culture. And who were the serious scientists, writers, painters, and creators at that meeting?" Dr. Kilibarda asks.

"No big surprise," was the initial reaction of Radomir Uljarevic, the poet and editor of OKTOIH, to the founding of the Montenegrin Matica. "As I understand it," Uljarevic says, "these were the people who have formed practically everything that exists in Montenegro: Montenegrin PEN, the Mausoleum, the Lexicography Institute, the Montenegrin Matica, five or six political parties, including the Communist Party, and so on." Uljarevic says that there is "enthusiasm for every type of praise. I am actually happy; I have dear friends among these people, and I am a little concerned about whether they will in fact carry all this through. If a Serbian Matica had been formed on the same day, in the same place, there would be 'equality,' that would be a great date in the history of our disagreements, in the history of our nationalisms. This is a great date only to a certain degree. That degree can be calculated precisely and expressed in percentages," says Uljarevic.

Like many other things in Montenegro that affect the Serb-Montenegrin sphere, the emergence of the Montenegrin Matica has been received and interpreted in various ways. The attitude of the official authorities toward this "newborn child" remains to be seen. For now, the fact that the founding meeting was attended by university rector Dr. Bozidar Nikolic and Minister of Education and Schooling Dr. Predrag Obradovic, as well as the fact Minister of Culture Gojko Celevic avoided being in Cetinje, does not say much.

Serbia

Graduate Assistants Paid DM5 Per Month

93BA1099C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 26 May 93 p 12

[Article by V. Jelacic: "How Society Cares for Young Specialists: Five Marks Per Talented Head"]

[Text] *This month, the Republican Fund for the Labor Market is paying young talents, who last year were employed by Belgrade graduate schools, 70 percent of the average March wage in the republic, meaning five German marks [DM].*

In practice, society is demonstrating its concern for young talents by paying them DM5 a month. This is the exact amount that the state, or rather the Republican Fund for the Labor Market, is paying approximately 500 young, talented, and selected specialists who last year were employed by Belgrade graduate schools. They are offered the opportunity to work and improve themselves, and it is promised that each month they will get 70 percent of the previous month's average personal income in the republic.

It is true that the approximately DM5 paid out per person in mid-May, when converted to dinars, is 70 percent of the average March wage in Serbia. But time and inflation have taken their share.

Graduate School Subsidizing State

"If the declared concern for the best, most talented, select few comes down to the payment of DM5, then it is hardly any wonder that more and more of them are in line for visas at foreign embassies," is the complaint at Belgrade's School of Civil Engineering, which last year accepted 12 young men and women with the title "young talent." They got their degrees at that college, have a high average, and meet all the conditions for acceptance in the post of assistant trainee. In order not to lose them, in order to hold on to the best of the best, and in order for them not to stand in line every month for only DM5, the School of Civil Engineering decided to subsidize the state.

"We made sure that our young talents receive each month at least 70 percent of the wage of assistant trainees (instead of the state's DM5, we will assure them DM25), we provided them with free postgraduate study, work with an advisor, a free transport ticket, and a hot meal. Our aim is to keep them for another year and to employ the best ones as assistants," explains assistant professor Dr. Branislav Ivkovic, the vice dean of the School of Civil Engineering, adding that his and other technical graduate schools can do this thanks to cooperative efforts with industry, but also the goodwill of employees who forgo their salaries. However, it is essential that in the future the young talents receive enough pay from society to at least cover the minimum wage in the current month.

It has been decided at the School of Civil Engineering to do everything possible to enroll the best high school graduates and to hold on to the best degree candidates.

Free Study Sessions

This year as well, the professors and assistants at this graduate school will organize free study sessions for all students about to take final examinations in math and physics. From 7 to 11 June and from 14 to 18 June, graduating seniors can attend free sessions from 0800 to 1300 every day (three hours a day on math and two on physics) where they will refresh their high school subject matter, practice on problems in entry exams from previous years, and finally get to know their future professors, says assistant professor Dr. Djordje Vuksanovic, the vice dean for instruction. However, Mr. Vuksanovic warns that the School of Civil Engineering believes that abolishing qualification exams that imply that a future student must cross a certain threshold of knowledge would be harmful both to the school and to society. Because one must have a minimum of knowledge in order to get a student's booklet, Dr. Vuksanovic says.

In addition, the School of Engineering has promised that it will do everything possible to see to it that young people this year who decide to enroll to study civil engineering can

defer their military service until after the completion of study. This would reduce the rush to the School of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, whose students already have this privilege, while allowing young people to enroll where they really want to go instead of at a school through which they can put off donning a military uniform.


In any event, concern for higher-quality study, concern that these best students will enroll and stay at colleges, is not simply a concern of those colleges, but also a concern of society, which has committed itself on paper to helping members of the next academic generation and to keeping them in the country.

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